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ABSTRACT

This report presents the results of a literature survey on team policing, based on references currently available and accessible through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, the National Technical Information Service, and commercial publishers. (In team policing a group of officers under common supervision are responsible for all police services within a specific geographical area.) The first of seven chapters introduces team policing from a historical viewpoint and traces its development and definition. Chapter 2 deals specifically with the apparent effects of team organization, composition, and assignment on reported crime, clearance rates, civil disorders, response time, dispatch, and corruption. Chapter 3 discusses the role expansion implicit in team policing and its effects on the patrol officer, the quality of service achieved, job satisfaction, and police professionalism. Chapter 4 covers the effects the altered supervisory role of team leaders has on officer discipline, communication among teams and team members, and team and department cohesiveness. Chapter 5 describes the impact of team policing upon police community relations and citizen involvement in law enforcement. Chapter 6 provides a framework for evaluating the specific results of team policing which are reported in the literature. Chapter 7 discusses how police training programs have changed in order to accommodate the needs of team policing. The appendix includes an inventory of the hypotheses suggested by the literature review, two additional discussions on team policing, and examples of team policing definitions and goal statements from the literature. (EM)

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NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM

Issues in Team Policing: A Review of the Literature

By

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CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	v
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	1
A. The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement	1
B. The 1973 Commission on Standards and Goals	2
C. Defining Team Policing	3
CHAPTER II: IMPACT OF TEAM POLICING UPON CRIME CONTROL FACTORS	5
A. Team Organization and Composition	5
B. Impact of Team Policing upon Crime Control	6
C. Patrol Workload Management	7
D. Team Policing and Corruption	8
CHAPTER III: IMPACT OF TEAM POLICING UPON THE ROLE OF THE OFFICER	9
A. Quality of Service Delivery	9
B. Officer Job Satisfaction	10
C. Professionalism	11
CHAPTER IV: IMPACT OF TEAM POLICING ON SUPERVISION AND LEADERSHIP	12
A. Role of the Supervisor	12
B. Changes in Officer-Supervisor Relationships	12
C. Team Cohesiveness and Police Operations	13
CHAPTER V: COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES AND IMPACTS OF TEAM POLICING	15
A. Permanent Assignment of Officers	16
B. Service-Oriented Police-Citizen Contact	17
C. Citizen Participation in Law Enforcement	19
D. Summary	20
CHAPTER VI: EVALUATION OVERVIEW	22
A. Nature of the Evaluation Effort and Results	22
B. Problems	23
CHAPTER VII: TRAINING FOR TEAM POLICING	26
A. The Community as a Focus of Training	26
B. The Team as a Focus of Training	27
C. The Impact of the Team upon Investigative Training	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY	29
Appendix A. HYPOTHESES	35
Appendix B. THE SYSTEMS CONTEXT OF TEAM POLICING PROGRAMS	40
Appendix C. ENGLISH UNIT BEAT POLICING	45
Appendix D. TEAM POLICING DEFINITIONS	48
Appendix E. TEAM POLICING GOALS	50
Appendix F. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE	51

4

PREFACE

The National Sheriffs' Association has prepared this report, *ISSUES IN TEAM POLICING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE*, under Grant Number 75–NI–99–0065, of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. It is one in a series of reports in the area of patrol operations and is part of the Institute's National Evaluation Program.

ISSUES IN TEAM POLICING presents the results of a critical survey of the literature on team policing currently available and accessible through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, the National Technical Information Service and commercial publishers. While the project has solicited reports of team policing programs from individual departments and consultants, only a limited number of these have been used in writing the report. The reporting and assessment of individual project evaluation materials will be included in later reports. Where appropriate, the researchers have consulted team policing practitioners and analysts to add depth and background to this review. A list of individuals interviewed is included in the appendices.

In preparing this report it became apparent that team policing is not a program that impacts solely upon the delivery of police services. Rather it implies major changes in the way urban police have been organizing their departments for the past twenty years. The magnitude of the reorganization implicit in team policing has been, perhaps, more critical in determining the success of a particular program than has its impact upon crime or the community. In this regard, although team policing has usually focused upon the community as its constituency, its success or failure has often rested upon the support of various constituencies within the police department itself - the investigative division and mid-level managers in particular.

The Report

The text of this report is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I, "Introduction and Historical Perspective," introduces team policing from an historical viewpoint and traces its development and definition. It concludes with a discussion of the major activities of most team policing programs. Chapters II through V elaborate more fully the individual elements and activities of team policing, and the assumed effects as compared with the actual effects reported in the literature.

Chapter II, "Impact of Team Policing upon Crime Control Factors," deals specifically with team organization, composition and assignment and the apparent effects on reported crime, clearance rates, civil disorders, response time, dispatch, and corruption. Chapter III, "Impact of Team Policing on the Role of the Officer," is concerned with the role expansion implicit in team policing - and its effects on the patrol officer, the quality of service achieved, job satisfaction, and police professionalism. Chapter IV, "Impact of Team Policing on Supervision and Leadership," indicates the effects the altered supervisory role of team leaders has on such variables as officer discipline, communication among teams and team members, and team and department cohesiveness.

Chapter V, "Community Activities and Impacts of Team Policing," describes the impact of team policing upon police-community relations and citizen involvement in law enforcement. Three key concepts are addressed: stable geographic assignment of officers; service-oriented police-citizen contact; and citizen participation in law enforcement activities.

Chapter VI, "Evaluation Overview," provides a framework for examining the specific results attributed to team policing which are reported in the literature. Attention is focused on the nature of the evaluation literature, its limitations, and the problems associated with evaluating team policing programs.

Chapter VII, "Training for Team Policing," is a discussion of the ways in which police training programs have changed in order to accommodate the needs of team policing. Most team training programs have adopted novel approaches and materials in order to familiarize team officers with group processes and human relations problems.

The Appendices

Appendix A is an inventory of the hypotheses suggested by our literature review. These hypotheses identify presumed relationships among variables related to the setting, elements, and effects of team policing programs. The hypotheses will be revised and further developed as project research uncovers additional supportive or non-supportive evaluation results.

Two additional discussions of team policing appear in the Appendices. Appendix B, "The Systems Context of Team Policing Programs," provides a discussion of community and organizational issues which team policing programs can address. The discussion focuses upon the potential contributions which team policing can make for resolving the problems of police agencies inherent in their existing organizational structures. Appendix C, "English Unit Beat Policing" is a discussion of the English approach to team policing. Unit Beat Policing emphasizes integrating patrol and investigative functions and developing police services which are responsive to the changing needs of relatively small beat areas. Exemplary team policing definitions and goal statements found in the literature are also located in the Appendices.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Both the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), and the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals (1973), have recommended that police agencies study and evaluate the role team policing might play in their organizations. Unfortunately, much of the team policing information available to police administrators describes only the principles underlying team policing or the successes of individual programs, rather than their problems or failures. Hopefully, this report will present a balanced assessment of team policing, including its positive and negative aspects.

When we initially examined team policing, it appeared to differ from more traditional approaches to law enforcement in degree rather than in kind. As the study progressed, however, it became clear that team policing could involve radical departures from the generally prevailing quasi-military style of traditional police organization. Because of the scope of the organizational changes implicit in team policing, a major problem in implementing a successful team policing program is the dynamic process by which change is brought about. Knowing what team policing is and how it relates to the solution of law enforcement problems, is a prelude to devising strategies that can facilitate implementation. In this literature review, we are concerned with describing the various elements of team policing and with indicating what impact team policing might have upon the delivery of police services, the officer and the community.

The development of team policing as an idea and then a program in the United States, has been an evolutionary process that has drawn upon the English experience with Unit Beat Policing (see Appendix C) and the decentralized patrol operations of police agencies in American small towns and cities. When the English converted to highly mobilized police forces in the 1960's they sought to maintain close rapport with citizens by keeping a number of constables assigned to foot patrol beats. The English theorized that by combining motorized and foot units, response time could be appreciably reduced without sacrificing police-citizen cooperation. Although some team police programs in the United States have used foot patrols, the majority have sought to establish police-citizen contact and cooperation by supplying officers with hand held radios and encouraging them to leave their patrol cars frequently to meet and talk with citizens.

A second feature of English Unit Beat Policing adopted by many team programs has been the assignment of some investigative responsibility to the team. The English did this by assigning an investigator to each beat and by encouraging constables to undertake minor investigations. In many small American communities police officers and sheriff's deputies have been assigned similar investigative responsibilities. Although not all team policing programs have assigned investigative authority to patrol officers, most have sought to expand the officer's job role by assigning him more responsibilities and by giving him more descretion to carry out his work. Both the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 1973 National Advisory Commission have recommended that American departments adopt features of Unit Beat Policing.

A. The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement

A major recommendation of the 1967 Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was that team policing could overcome the problems created in most urban police agencies by centralization and task specialization. The Commission was particularly concerned with the isolation of patrol and investigative forces. It pointed out that the rigid separation of patrol and investigative branches not only led to conflict between the two groups but also hindered efforts to solve crimes.

The Commission suggested the creation of a team of agents, patrolmen, and community service officers as a means to divide police functions more rationally and to provide better police service to the community. These teams of officers would be assigned to specific geographic areas or neighborhoods and be responsible to single commanders. The primary goals of this system were to foster cooperation between patrolmen and detectives and to create a career ladder that would attract more qualified recruits and reward the more competent personnel in the department. The implementation of this system in medium and large departments could be accomplished by

creating three classes of police - agents, officers, and community service representatives. The tasks assigned to these officers would be based upon their skills and job performance.

The entry level position for this "team" would be the *community service officer*. He would assist the patrol officer and the police agent but would be primarily responsible for providing non-crime services to the community. As his education, skills and competence increased, the community service officer would become a patrol officer, responsible for law enforcement and minor investigative functions. The *patrol officer* would respond to calls for service, perform routine patrol functions, and investigate traffic accidents. The *police agent* would be assigned to the most complicated and demanding police tasks. Although these agents would engage in investigative work, they would be assigned to a mixed team of patrol and community service officers (PCLEAJ, 1967, pp. 53; 121–125).

The assignment of investigative work as well as detectives to mixed teams of generalists and specialists has become an important element of most team policing programs. Departments have adopted this mode of operation and organization with the idea that increased officer-investigator contact and communication will streamline the investigative process, leading to a higher rate of crime solution. In addition, it has been argued that the incorporation of investigative functions into the basic patrol unit or team, will enlarge the job role and responsibilities of the patrolman by providing an organizational context for him to perform more complicated tasks as his experience increases.

B. The 1973 Commission on Standards and Goals

Although the 1967 Commission recommended that teams be assigned to neighborhoods, it was more interested in the impact the team would have upon the internal organization of the department - especially the impact of the team upon improved investigative work and officer job satisfaction. The 1973 Commission on Standards and Goals, on the other hand emphasized more strongly the need to increase citizen-police cooperation. The report noted that in recent years, because of changes in community attitudes and police patrol techniques, "many police agencies have become increasingly isolated from the community" (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 154). Whereas the 1967 Commission's discussion of team policing focused upon changing the structure of the basic patrol unit, the 1973 Commission stressed the adoption of techniques to improve police-citizen cooperation as a means to prevent and control crime.

The basic rationale for team policing, as stated in the Standards and Goals report was "that the team learns its neighborhood, its people and its problems" (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 154). To accomplish this goal, the Commission recommended that patrol officers make a special effort to interact more with the people in their beat area. This interaction was to be stimulated by encouraging officers to leave their patrol cars periodically to walk and talk with people. The conversion of motorized beats to foot patrols was also recommended. The increased citizen contact, spawned by foot patrols, would provide police with additional information resulting in increased apprehension rates. The permanent assignment of officers and teams to a specific geographic area where the team would be responsible for all police services was also recommended as a tactic to strengthen the police-community bond.

The 1973 Standards and Goals report also recognized the important role the implementation process plays in the development of a successful team policing program. Police administrators in a number of cities have learned that new organizational and service delivery systems cannot be implemented by administrative fiat. An undertaking like team policing demands that personnel throughout an agency reorient the way they think about and deliver police services to the community. The 1973 Commission cautioned administrators to include agency personnel in the planning process and to develop appropriate training programs to ease the transition from traditional to team policing methods of operation (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 159).

The failure to involve agency personnel from all levels in the planning process has been a serious defect of many team policing programs. The support of middle level managers is especially critical to the implementation of a successful program. The Commission recommended that the planning process can be used as a mechanism by which agency personnel can be introduced to the participant style of decision-making sought in many team policing programs. Participation in planning can give officers an opportunity to develop some of the skills needed to successfully carry out the expanded job role characteristic of most team policing. Likewise, training programs can be developed that will enable the mid-level managers, first line supervisors and officers to acquaint themselves with the team style of policing (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 160).

The recommendation of the 1973 report on Standards and Goals that police agencies concentrate upon developing improved police-community cooperation as an effective tool in the war against crime has been an important element of team policing. However, like the 1967 Advisory Commission Report, the 1973 Standards and Goals has provided only a limited glimpse of team policing

programs as they are being implemented across the country in both large and small communities.

C. Defining Team Policing

This review of the literature will make no attempt to present a single "correct" definition of team policing. There is none. Team policing has been defined somewhat differently in every community where it has been found. There are thus as many different "definitions" of team policing as there are programs. Because there is no single overriding definition or model, the approach followed in this review will be to look at team policing programs as combinations of various activities focused to achieve certain goals. Since each program consists of a different combination of activities, the "evaluation question" is one of determining the effects of individual or combinations of team policing activities.

Table 1–1, Program Aspects of Team Policing, lists the major team policing elements and the activities generally undertaken to operationalize them. These strategies basically fall into two categories - those of an Organizational or Team Building character and those of a Neighborhood or Community Relations character. Organization-related activities have included such program features as the organization of officers into teams, enlargement of the patrol officer's role, and the participation of officers in operational planning and decision-making. Community-related activities have included stable neighborhood assignment of officers, emphasis upon foot patrols and non-aggressive tactics, more deliberate provision of non-crime services and increased efforts to involve citizens in crime control.

These individual activities, as integrated into team policing programs, represent attempts to achieve certain goals - goals arising from the organizational and community needs which the programs were designed to meet. Two evaluation issues are thereby implied: what have been the effects of these combinations of activities known as team policing, and to what extent can these effects be attributed to specific program features or combinations of features?

Subsequent chapters of this report will discuss the major activities of team policing programs, as well as their assumed and reported effects. Chapters II, III and IV focus on the organizational effects of team policing, while Chapter V discusses the impact of community activities.

Table 1–1

PROGRAM ASPECTS OF TEAM POLICING

ORGANIZATION AND TEAM BUILDING ASPECTS	
ELEMENTS	ACTIVITIES
Team Organization	• Permanant assignment of officers to teams of from 14–56 officers • Permanant team assignment to shift or 24–hour responsibility for neighborhood • Manpower allocation based on crime analysis and patrol workload • Assignment of specialists and specialist responsibilities to teams
Enlarged Job Role of Officer	• Generalist/specialist officers • Participation in team planning and decision-making
Altered Supervisory Role and Decentralization	• Supervisor as planner/manager/leader • Unified command structure • Development of policy guidelines • Participant and decentralized decision-making • Team meetings to plan operations • Team information coordination
NEIGHBORHOOD OR COMMUNITY RELATIONS ASPECTS	
STRATEGY	ACTIVITIES
Stable Geographic Assignment	• Officers work in a defined neighborhood for an extensive period
Service-Orientation and Increased Citizen Contact	• Referral and "special" services • Storefront headquarters • Officer participation in community activities • Walk and talk programs • Foot and scooter patrol • Non-aggressive patrol tactics • Informal "blazer" uniforms • Specially marked cars
Increased Citizen Participation in Law Enforcement	• Citizen volunteer programs • Crime prevention programs • Citizen advisory councils • Community meetings

CHAPTER II. IMPACT OF TEAM POLICING UPON CRIME CONTROL FACTORS

An important rationale for the introduction of team policing has been its presumed effects upon the ability of the police to deter crime and apprehend offenders. Advocates of team policing have argued that the incorporation of investigative responsibilities into the team will streamline the investigative process and develop a more effective departmental investigative capability. In addition, they have also argued that since many crimes are solved by information from informants and citizens, the improved police-community cooperation found in most team policing programs will greatly enhance the flow of information from the community to the police. The better level of communications between the public and the police will also provide an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to launch voluntary crime control programs. If this rationale and the associated activities are effective, team policing should deter crime, improve clearance rates and result in a greater recovery of stolen property when compared with areas policed in more traditional ways.

A. Team Organization and Composition

Two organizational features distinguish team policing from traditional preventive patrol operations. These are the permanent assignment of officers to a particular neighborhood or beat for an extended period of time and the creation of mixed teams of officers with patrol and investigative skills. Both of these features represent significant departures from traditional patrol operations where officers are rotated periodically to new beats, are frequently dispatched outside their beats to answer calls and where patrol and investigative personnel are functionally isolated from one another.

1. *Team Assignment to a Specific Area.* The most salient dimension of team policing has been the assignment of a relatively stable group of officers to a specific geographic area or neighborhood. This team of officers is generally assigned responsibility for providing all law enforcement services in the team area. Team policing advocates have argued that because the same group of officers and supervisory personnel is responsible for the team area, it is possible to hold the team accountable for the quality of its service delivery system and the level of crime in the community.

Several methods have been used to determine the size of team policing areas and the level of manpower assigned to the area. Some programs have determined beat size on the basis of crime analysis and workload demand. Other programs have identified pre-existing or "natural" neighborhoods that are geographically, politically, or culturally distinct areas as team areas. In Albany and Tucson, for example, police planners identified geographically distinct minority communities with high levels of crime and severely strained police-community relations as sites for their team programs. The identification of "natural" neighborhoods has generally been used where agencies implement team policing as a pilot program or a strategy to accomplish specific goals.

Whether team policing was implemented city-wide or only in selected areas, however, standard law enforcement allocation systems have generally been used to distribute manpower to team areas. Manpower assignments to teams have been based upon the ratio of patrolmen to neighborhood population, the crime rate, or patrol workload. The number of officers assigned to teams has ranged from approximately fourteen to fifty-six. Team size is not only dependent upon neighborhood population, crime rate and workload but also on the amount of responsibility assigned to the team. The review of the literature has uncovered two basic types of teams - those that are assigned twenty-four hour responsibility for an area and those that are assigned responsibility for only one shift or approximately eight hours. In the latter case, three teams are assigned to a neighborhood. (The shift versus the twenty-four hour responsibility concept of team organization accounts for the substantial range in team sizes - the shift-organized team being smaller.

The organizational implications of a shift versus a twenty-four hour team are unclear. A police planner in Albany has asserted that although the team is assigned twenty-four hour responsibility, in reality there are three teams, each working a different shift. Teams assigned twenty-four hour responsibility are usually headed by a

lieutenant while shift teams are generally commanded by a sergeant. Of more importance, perhaps to the effectiveness of a team, is not whether the team is assigned twenty-four hour or eight hour responsibility, but whether or not team members are regularly assigned to work the same shift together and are responsible to a single first line supervisor. Although these issues have not been investigated, there is substantial qualitative evidence to suggest that they may be critical factors in determining the effectiveness of team policing.

2. *Team Investigative Responsibilities*. A second dimension of team policing has been the degree to which investigative functions have been transferred from specialized and highly centralized detective divisions to teams. Team policing advocates have generally argued that the patrolman's knowledge of his beat is indispensible in solving crime and that he should be assigned some investigative responsibilities. Although the literature touches only lightly upon this issue, conversations with police planners have indicated that the assignment of detectives to teams is a significant issue in the successful implementation of a team program. Assigning detectives to police teams undermines the job status hierarchy found in most police departments. To many detectives, the assignment to a team smacks of reversion to the patrol work done before he was elevated to the investigative division. Because of this, detectives have frequently been staunch opponents of team policing.

We have identified three methods by which team policing programs have attempted to decentralize investigative functions. All involve the degree to which officers are given investigative responsibilities, the extent to which detectives are assigned to the team, and the way the investigators are supervised. Team policing programs have decentralized investigative operations by creating:

- Teams of generalist officers who perform many investigative functions but who can call in specialists (detectives) to perform specific tasks. The detectives are not under team supervision.
- Mixed teams of generalists (patrolmen) and specialists (detectives) organized in teams with common team supervision. In this type structure, a centralized detective division is responsible for certain types of investigations. This system has been used in Detroit, New York, Albany, St. Petersburg and Venice.
- Teams of generalist officers who are responsible for all investigative work. Each generalist officer has a specialized skill which contributes to the function of the team and permits the dissolution of all centralized investigative activities. Only Dayton has experimented with this approach.

There is some controversy concerning the extent to which investigative functions and patrol activities can be integrated into the police team. An evaluation of the Dayton project, where team generalists/specialists performed *all* investigative work, concluded that a large centralized detective force is not a necessity (Tortoriello & Blatt, 1974, p. 38). However, it is unclear how much and in what areas the investigative function can be safely decentralized to the team without sacrificing efficiency. Most agencies have assigned only limited investigative responsibilities to their teams. One team policing advocate has suggested that narcotics, vice, intelligence activities, forged document investigations and warrant services might better be performed by specialists rather than generalists within a team (Kenney, 1972, p. 22).

B. Impact of Team Policing Upon Crime Control

A central concern of police administrators in evaluating new programs is the efficiency and/or effectiveness with which programs are able to accomplish traditional law enforcement goals. A number of measures and indicators have been developed by law enforcement agencies to evaluate the merits of new and established programs. The discussion of team policing's impact upon crime control activities included here, is based only upon a small range of these measures. Included are discussions of crime control, patrol workload management and corruption.

1. *Reported Crime Rates*. The evidence suggests that some team policing programs have resulted in a reduction in crime and improved clearance rates. In Venice, California a significant reduction in crimes accompanied the improved police-community relations created by the team policing program. Burglary rates dropped by forty-three percent and auto theft rates were down forty-two percent. Burglaries from autos also dropped by twenty percent (NCOP, 1973, p. 34). In New Brunswick, New Jersey a sixty percent drop in index crimes was reported during the first six months of the project (O'Brien, 1974, pp. 7–8). A survey in Albuquerque indicated that officers thought the crime rate had diminished as a result of the team policing program (Sears & Wilson, 1973, p. 49). In Cincinnati, "decreases in reported crime were noted for burglary, robbery and auto theft," whereas "in the remainder of the city, robbery also decreased, but burglary showed a marked increase" (Schwartz et al., 1975, p. 4). With the exception of Cincinnati, no city has undertaken a victimization survey.

2. *Clearance Rates*. Communities implementing team

policing have also reported improved clearance rates. An evaluation of the Dayton program reports that

> in terms of clearance rate per man, clearance rate per man for Part I crimes, and property recovered per man, the officers in the CCTP district did a significantly better job than did those officers providing service for the traditional district. (Tortoriello & Blatt, 1974, p. 38)

In Albuquerque the rate of clearance of serious crimes reportedly doubled (Sears & Wilson, 1973, pp. xxi–xxii). In Venice the proportion of crimes cleared through citizen information was significantly higher than the California average (Police Foundation, 1974, p. 4).

In addition to reduced crime rates, improved clearance rates and increased information flow, evaluators have reported other indicators of the ability of team policing to control crime. In Detroit officers felt they had developed a better ability to recognize suspicious circumstances requiring further investigation. Evaluators in Detroit also concluded that because team officers were better acquainted with the neighborhood and its people, they were better able to judge the reliability of their information sources. As a consequence the arrests made were more likely to result in judicial proceedings and convictions for those apprehended (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, pp. 61–62).

3. *Civil Disorders*. Team policing may be a form of police organization relevant for control of civil disorders. One source of police inefficiency during civil disorders has been a lack of experience in group operations (Bittner, 1970, p. 59). By decentralizing into teams, police may gain experience with group operations which has not been realized with centralized organization. The Richmond, California Police Department found that their team organization reduced the time needed to mobilize, make field assignments and deploy the police force during civil disturbance (Phelps & Murphy, 1969, p. 50).

C. Patrol Workload Management

The adoption of a new program generally involves a trade-off of benefits to achieve a desirable objective. One police administrator might be willing to sacrifice some efficiency in manpower utilization in order to achieve a better response capability or improved clearance rates. Several team policing programs have attempted to compare the efficiency with which manpower are utilized in the team area vis a vis traditional patrol. The limited evidence* suggests that team policing has generally led to a more efficient utilization of manpower. For instance, Richmond found that team policing generally improved the department's ability to coordinate its manpower deployment with service demands (Phelps & Harmon, 1972, p. 4). After adopting team policing, San Bruno reported a "significant increase" in patrol mileage (Cann, 1972, p. 64). In Detroit analysts noted a more rapid return of cars to service after dispatch calls (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 61). Although these indicators of patrol workload management are makeshift, they do suggest that departments are concerned with efficient manpower utilization and that more sophisticated measures should be used to guage the relative efficiency with which team and traditional units utilize manpower.

In Detroit, the more efficient utilization of manpower by the team policing units brought charges from traditional patrol units that the team policing area had been assigned an excessive number of cars. Although manpower had been assigned to both the team and non-team areas on the same basis, team commanders were able to deploy their men in a more efficient fashion. The result was that team areas generally had more cars available for dispatch calls than did traditional patrol units (Sherman et al., 1973, p. 96).

1. *Response Time*. The response time of police patrols to emergency calls is a common indicator of police efficiency and an issue of prime importance to most police administrators. Research has indicated that where police response to calls is less than five minutes, there is a sixty-six percent possibility that the criminal(s) will be apprehended. Where police response is five minutes or longer, the chances of apprehension drop to twenty percent. Reports have also indicated that citizen confidence in the police increases as response time decreases and that criminal activity is deterred when the criminal(s) are aware that police respond efficiently and quickly (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 193; NCOP, 1973, p. 19).

The effects of team policing upon response time have not been explicitly reported in any of the literature reviewed. The only evidence concerning the effects of team policing upon police response time is found in a single simulation experiment. That experiment concluded that the organization of patrols into teams yielded a more rapid rate of response than an alternative, more traditional organization of patrol where single officers responded only to calls within their assigned beats. Even though team policing produces slower response times than magnetic beat patrol (an organization of patrols where the closest available officers respond to incoming calls), the results of the simulation indicate that with minor exceptions, response times for team policing are as good as those for traditional patrol (Carlin & Moodie, 1972, pp. 27–31).

* Much of the information available about team policing programs has been written by police administrators involved in the programs. Their views are not completely unbiased.

2. *Integrity of Dispatch*. In order to achieve the maximum degree of dispatch integrity, the team members must have the full cooperation of dispatchers. Because dispatchers have not been a part of the team, they have sometimes been insensitive to integrity of dispatch and have sent cars outside their team area to answer calls (Sherman, et al., 1973, p. 96). Analysis done in Detroit suggests that even where team organization has not been adopted for an entire department, this problem can be minimized. The Detroit report indicated that in seventy-five percent of the cases where a team patrol was assigned outside of the Beat Command, another car had been available (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 59).

Studies indicate that team policing units spend more time on each dispatch call than traditional patrol units. An analysis in Dayton reported that team patrols required an average of eighteen minutes more per call. The greater amount of time required was a result of the increased amount of responsibility given patrolmen for gathering information and undertaking follow-up investigations (Tortoriello & Blatt, 1974, p. 38).

D. Team Policing and Corruption

A primary concern of police administrators is evaluating the probable impact that organizational change might have upon the control of corruption within the department. Police administrators have looked to the quasi-military model of organization as a means by which to control corruption (Bittner, 1973, pp. 172–173). The ability of the traditional police organization to discipline and transfer officers frequently has been viewed as an important corruption control technique. Since team policing has been proclaimed as representing a modern return to the old idea of "the cop on the beat," there has been a natural concern that team policing might represent a return to the corruption of an earlier era.

The researchers were unable to find any assessment of the impact of team organization upon the problem of corruption. Two varying points of view have been stated about the possible effects of team policing upon corruption. One viewpoint expressed by police administrators has asserted that the improved supervision of police achieved by team policing will reduce the possibilities for police corruption. Another point of view states that stable assignment of police to a neighborhood would increase the opportunities for corruption.

Several factors might make corruption more difficult in a team policing context. The basic neighborhood emphasis and visibility of the officer, for example, may reduce possibilities of corruption. Since the team as a group is responsible for law enforcement activities in a community, the team "lessens the danger of corrupting a single officer in a single area" (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 154). Less frequently noted, however, in determining the potential corruption, is the general lack of community interest in controlling an officer's behavior via corruption. The concerns of community pressure groups are commonly aimed at department policy, rather than individual officers. Like the efforts of the individuals corrupting police, the efforts of pressure groups are to change police policies being applied (Kaufman, 1973, p. 45).

It is worth noting that a certain amount of misconduct is virtually inevitable. Information gaps, the limits upon the receptivity of top level administrators to lower level reports, fragmentation within the organization and group solidarities all virtually assure some corruption (Kaufman, 1973, p. 62). How effectively team policing develops new forms of police leadership, establishes measures for evaluating police performance, and gains the support and respect of the community, are critical issues in establishing an environment hostile to corruption. No program has so far attempted to evaluate the effects of team policing on corruption.

In summary, although several agencies have attempted to measure the impact of team policing upon crime rates, clearance and response time, the information reported is more suggestive of what team policing can do than what it is actually accomplishing. Because the information reported here is based entirely upon published accounts, we cannot make any claim as to the validity and/or reliability of the reports. During the next stage of the project, a more thorough review of evaluation materials and methodologies will permit us to venture firmer conclusions concerning the impact of team policing upon crime control activities, workload management and corruption.

CHAPTER III. IMPACT OF TEAM POLICING UPON THE ROLE OF THE OFFICER

A major element in most team policing programs has been an attempt to make police work more attractive by expanding the job role and responsibilities of the officer. No longer is the recruit simply faced with the prospect of being a patrolman whose responsibilities are somewhat limited. Inherent within the team policing concept is the generalist/specialist operational approach to fighting crime. This is based on the proposition that it is necessary to assign officers more responsibilities as their skills and experience increase, with a view toward attracting and retaining highly qualified men and women. Using the generalist/specialist approach to crime fighting enables the department to use the rising level of talents within the patrol forces while at the same time dealing with the recurring problem of job satisfaction and self esteem faced by the individual officer.

Team policing has not only assigned more skilled responsibilities like investigations and community relations to the officer but has also expected officers to participate in the planning and decision-making processes of the team. Although most team policing programs have adopted the expanded job role for officers as part of their team policing programs, questions have been raised concerning the ability and willingness of all officers to accept these added responsibilities. One team policing administrator has suggested that not all officers can "rise to the level of team competence" (Savord, 1973, p. 22).

Team policing has generally placed a considerable amount of trust in the ability of patrolmen to use their discretion in performing complex police tasks. This trust is reflected in the universal attempt by team policing programs to develop the generalist officer's capability of handling a variety of patrol and investigative functions frequently handled by specialists. Generalist officers, for example, have usually been expected to perform follow-up investigations, develop crisis-intervention skills and engage in police-community activities. In Dayton, for example, generalist officers responded to all complaints and pursued investigations to their ultimate disposition. In Cincinnati, team officers were given responsibility for all investigations except homicides and were given authority to deactivate cases. In most team policing programs the assignment of such specialist functions to the team has symbolized the expansion of the officer's job role. Four issues are of primary importance in determining the viability of assigning the added responsibilities to team officers. These issues are:

- The impact on the quality of service delivery using the generalist/specialist approach.
- The ability of patrolmen to accept the added responsibility expected of them by team policing and the importance this has upon operations.
- The impact these added responsibilities has upon the officer's job satisfaction.
- The impact of the enlarged job role upon professionalization.

A. Quality of Service Delivery

Although the evidence is limited, it would appear that the most important question for police departments concerns the quality of the services which the generalist can provide. One belief expressed by a number of commanders has been that the higher morale of patrolmen acting as generalists/specialists more than compensates for the loss of any specialized skills. These commanders have asserted that police service becomes more effective when morale is high and, in the case of investigations, when one officer follows a case from complaint to its ultimate disposition (Police Foundation, 1974, p. 5). A west coast police chief, expressing some reservations about the use of generalists, noted that although "optimum proficiency is seldom really achieved, most personnel develop the necessary skills for performance of specialized tasks" (Savord, 1973, p. 26). Evidence has been found to support both viewpoints.

A number of commanders have noted the increased morale which occurs when patrolmen are given more responsibilities (Police Foundation, 1974, p. 5). In Richmond, California team officers who were accountable to a particular sergeant gained confidence in their ability to carry out responsibility (Phelps & Harmon, 1972, p. 4). Evaluators in Dayton concluded that gen-

eralists who were assigned all investigative responsibilities, were reluctant to call upon any specialists other than evidence technicians or photographers. Serving as a generalist/specialist was a matter of pride for these officers (OLEPA, 1972, p. 5). In Venice, California officers were reported to regard any increase in crime rates in their beat as a personal affront (Davis, 1973, p. 13). Finally, in Detroit, analysts attributed the more rapid return of patrols to service, to the officer's increased involvement in his neighborhood (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 61).

Several observers have noted that when officers are unable to develop individual initiative and when leadership is lacking, team morale and effectiveness may suffer (Davis, 1973, pp. 2–13). An example of this problem occurred in Detroit, New York, Syracuse and Richmond where there was a tendency for team patrols to leave their areas simply out of boredom (Sherman et al., 1973, p. 74). Aside from individual initiative and morale, the level of resources and training provided to teams may play an important role in achieving effective service delivery. Dayton and Richmond reported an inability to provide team officers with all of the specialized training originally planned. Because of these constraints, Richmond was unable to develop the follow-up investigative skills of the team officers (OLEPA, 1972, p. 4; Phelps & Harmon, 1972, p. 3).

A more subtle general problem in developing a generalist officer is the possibility that as the officer's level of skill increases, there is a risk that the interests of the officer will become specialized. Expecting a patrolman, following his own interests exclusively, to remain a generalist may be an extreme demand. In the closely supervised context of a team policing program it may be possible, however, to accommodate, direct and control the development of a patrolman's general interests. Where patrolman are less closely supervised, their development as generalists may be more difficult. In conjunction with this it should be noted that generalist training can provide officers with an opportunity to use their newly gained skills to transfer into specialized divisions in their own departments or to enter other departments as specialists.

B. Officer Job Satisfaction

Increasing the satisfaction of officers with their jobs has been an emphasis in team policing. This emphasis has been important not only for the officer but also for the department since job satisfaction has been recognized as a critical element in increasing the efficiency and productivity of organizations. The National Commission on Productivity (1973, p. 60) has identified five techniques for measuring job satisfaction. Four of these measures are behavioral: job turnover, absenteeism, employee misconduct, and the responsiveness of employers to their employee's suggestions. The final measure of job satisfaction is based upon attitudinal information gained from survey questionnaires and interviews. Several team policing programs have used these techniques to measure the impact of team policing upon officer job satisfaction. Most departments that have implemented team policing have reported improvements in the degree to which participating officers are satisfied with their jobs.

A dramatic drop in the rate of employee turnover was reported in San Bruno, California (Cann, 1972, p. 64), and some analysis of officers' use of sick leave was reported in the Dayton, Detroit and San Bruno team policing programs. San Bruno experienced a thirty percent reduction in sick leave over a two year period, while the Dayton project reported no significant differences in sick leave between regular and team patrol organizations. The conclusion of the Dayton program evaluators was that the less stringent supervision found in team policing did not produce exceptional abuses of sick leave (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 62). In Detroit the results were inconclusive. For ten out of thirteen months for which data was available, the Detroit team averaged twenty percent fewer sick days, but during the three other months team absenteeism was slightly higher (Tortoriello & Blatt, 1974, p. 36).

Attitudinal data generally indicate that patrolmen prefer team organizations. The results of a survey conducted in San Bruno concluded that their patrolmen were highly satisfied with the program (Cann, 1972, p. 64). In Detroit, a survey indicated that Beat Command officers experienced greater job satisfaction (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 55). An evaluation of the Dayton program discerned a similar improvement in the morale of officers assigned to teams. A higher general level of morale and enthusiasm was found among Dayton's officers after team policing was implemented despite a

> heavy volume of workload, lack of promotional opportunities, shortage of manpower, interdepartmental racial difficulties, and an austerity-strapped city administration advocating unpopular police policies. (OLEPA, 1972, p. 10)

The attitudinal data collected for Cincinnati indicates that an increase in job satisfaction among team members, in turn caused a job satisfaction increase in other members of the department (Schwartz et al., 1975, pp. 27–33). From the available evidence it appears that team policing can make a general contribution to department morale and officer job satisfaction.

Despite the impact team policing may have upon the morale of a department, several problems must be considered when assessing these impacts. First, a significant

change in job satisfaction is dependent upon the atmosphere in which an officer is presently working. Where team policing represents a significant improvement in working conditions, the officer's job satisfaction should increase significantly. Such changes in working conditions and officer job satisfaction have been reported in San Bruno, California (Cann, 1972, p. 64). However, if a team policing program is implemented in a department where the level of job satisfaction is already high, less effect would be noted.

A second problem is that many team policing programs have relied upon volunteers as a source of manpower. Volunteers, whether attracted to team policing because of its program content or the opportunity to get out of an uncomfortable environment, will, in most cases, experience an increase in job satisfaction. In one instance, officers volunteering for the program indicated that they had no substantive interest in the program, and that they "would have joined any new program" (Sherman et al., 1973, pp. 65–66).

Finally, there is the problem that a program's evolution can affect the interest of the involved officers. Analysts in Albany have suggested that where a team policing program is implemented in a high-crime area, the interest of an officer, attracted to the program by its promised opportunities for crime fighting, faded as crime was brought under control. Similarly, an officer attracted to a team program because of his interest in community relations problems may become frustrated by the fact that his involvement in crime control programs can be detrimental to his relationship with the community.

C. Professionalism

Police analysts have noted that the current quasi-military method of supervision has proven detrimental to the development of the police officer as a professional capable of making wise and rational decisions. The military model encourages patrolmen to observe regulations rather than to adopt a flexible posture and take the steps demanded by a particular situation. A striking description of this problem is provided by Bittner:

> presently good and bad work practices are not distinguishable, or, more precisely, are not distinguished. Worst of all, we have good reasons to suspect that if some men are possessed by and act with professional acumen they keep it to themselves lest they will be found to be in conflict with some departmental regulation. (1973, p. 181)

To remedy this situation, reformers have urged the adoption of a system of departmental incentives rewarding police patrolmen who develop and use with discretion their patrol-related skills. The creation of discretionary guidelines has been regarded as a first step toward professionalizing police patrol (Bittner, 1973, p. 181; Boer & McIver, 1973, p. 164).

A basis for the development of professional standards of discretion is already prevalent among police. Skolnick claims that police conduct on the job "seems to be influenced more than anything else by an overwhelming concern to show themselves as competent craftsmen" (Skolnick, 1966, p. 111). Niederhoffer similarly has observed that police do self consciously seek to decide how the law should be applied and that they look for social cues upon which to base their decisions (Niederhoffer, 1967, pp. 60–61). How team policing has contributed to professionalization revolves around what recognition and encouragement team organization has given to the patrolmen's use of judgment and discretion.

Professionalism has been a salient concern in the police literature and a concern among the team policing practitioners. No evaluation of team policing has explicitly assessed its impact upon police professionalization. Three features of team policing programs, however, are likely to contribute to the professionalization of police work:

- the greater involvement of patrolmen in operational decision-making
- the more extensive duties of patrolmen and responsibilities for follow-up investigations, referrals and community relations
- the emphasis upon skill rather than rank as a basis for authority

The effect of these changes upon police status in the community is indirect. As noted above, there is some indication that assignment of police to a neighborhood does increase community support for the officer, and as a result, his satisfaction with his job. No attention at all, however, has been given to the impact of team policing upon community respect for police as professionals.

CHAPTER IV. IMPACT OF TEAM POLICING ON SUPERVISION AND LEADERSHIP

Team policing programs have, as their theoretical foundation, the concept of departmental decentralization. Decentralization appears to be crucial as an operational tool, enabling law enforcement to become more sensitive to the needs of the community. Only by encouraging officers to become familiar with the community can a police agency develop appropriate law enforcement priorities for a particular community.

Administrators are now realizing that there has to be direct input from those officers having the greatest degree of contact and communication with the residents. What has resulted is a change in the role of those within the team. Team officers are expected to participate in the planning operations for the specific area they patrol. In addition to being a supervisor, they have the responsibility under the team policing concept, for coordinating team planning and operations within the broad policy guidelines set by the department.

A. Role of the Supervisor

Team supervisors have frequently been given responsibilities formerly assigned to middle level officers. They are expected to function as administrators and coordinators, who with their men, carefully identify the problems of their assignment area and then develop a police service program to solve these problems. Such a conception of leadership has been a significant departure from that found in traditional quasi-military departments where the patrol sergeant carries out the directives of his supervisors without question. Unlike the sergeant in the traditional patrol unit, who merely supervises and disciplines his men, the team leader is expected to function as a director of professional activity (OLEPA, 1972, p. 9).

Understanding the implications of this expanded leadership role has been difficult for some team leaders. In more than one department, some reversion to the old supervisory system within the team structure was reported to have occurred (Zurcher, 1971, p. 56). Elsewhere, supervisors have only decreased their control and have been unable to imagine what they might do to support the field activities of their men (Sherman et al., 1973, p. 80). In other cases, leaders knew of their responsibility to develop policy and plan and coordinate team activities, but lacked the resources to carry out these responsibilities (Phelps & Murphy, 1969, p. 51; Sherman et al., 1973, p. 80). From the literature review it appears that developing the leadership capabilities of team leaders is dependent upon their understanding of the team concept and upon the training and organizational support for their roles.

In spite of the fact that team officers are given more discretion in patroling an area than their counterparts in traditional patrol units, observers have noted that team policing frequently results in better leadership such that the goals of the program and department are more efficiently implemented. One reason for this may be the simplification of the command structure which team policing represents. Team policing establishes a unified command structure and eliminates the contradictory commands frequently found in more traditional organizational models where patrolmen on rotating shifts frequently have different schedules than their sergeants. Because team commanders in Albuquerque worked the same shift and schedule as their men, the "wasted motion" of their prior command system was eliminated (Sears & Wilson, 1973, p. 50). In addition, the unified command structure of team policing has produced changes in the role of the first line supervisor, his relationship with his men and his disciplinary techniques.

B. Changes in Officer-Supervisor Relationships

Team policing has produced closer relationships between supervisors and officers. Where teams have been organized by shift, supervisors and their officers have socialized together on their days off. Through the resulting closer relationships, supervisors have gained better understandings of their men as individuals and have thus been able to take their officers' interests into account when making assignments. Neighborhood team leaders have arranged the schedules of their men to accommodate their desires to continue their studies. In Menlo Park, for

example, teams rotate shifts at the end of each semester so that officers can earn college credits with a minimum of disruption. In addition, all team organizations have increased the opportunity of supervisors to identify the talents of their officers. The team concept has permitted flexibility in assigning officers so that their individual skills and interests can be fully employed (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 57; Phelps & Harmon, 1972, p. 4; Zurcher, 1971, p. 56).

1. *Effects Upon Discipline*. The closer relationship between leader and officer found in team policing has produced some unanticipated changes in the use of disciplinary techniques. The general concern expressed has been that the close relationship of officers and their team supervisor could "erode some of the supervisor-subordinate hierarchy" (Police Foundation, 1974, p. 5). In one case, team policing resulted in the "favoritism" of sergeants toward their men. As a result, sergeants were found less ready to take formal disciplinary steps and sometimes sought to arrange prestigious transfers and promotions for their men. The development of such favoritism and vested interest was perceived to be "an inevitable result of the closeness between patrolmen and their sergeants fostered by the team system" (Phelps & Harmon, 1972, p. 5). However, since instances of favoritism have also been noted in departments without team policing, this problem is not unique (Bittner, 1970, p. 73). It is worth noting that a team leader's expressions of favor for his men should have a cohesive effect upon his team.

C. Team Cohesiveness and Police Operations

The possibility that teams might share information leading to better coordination of patrol activities has been an important objective of team policing. This objective is based upon the assumption that information sharing, particularly between patrolmen and detectives would have a beneficial impact upon the delivery of police services.

1. *Team Meetings and Participant Decision-Making*. A number of team policing programs have emphasized the use of frequent staff meetings as a means to plan operations and discuss team problems. Such conferences can be an important part of the process through which teams develop and pursue group objectives. It is not clear how effective these meetings have been in fostering information exchange and the coordination of team efforts. The value of these meetings is partially dependent upon the ability of the team leader to make the meetings useful (Sherman, Milton & Kelly, 1973, p. 84). Where team leaders do not possess group skills or have not been trained properly, these meetings may be less effective in facilitating communication among team members.

The idea that team policing operations should be outcomes of team planning has generally included a conception of a participative style decision-making for the team. Supporters of participant decision-making believe that group decisions tend to be based upon more complex considerations of problems and are thus better decisions. Two problems in applying this approach to police team decision-making have been noted:

- a lack of understanding of group decision-making processes among team members
- the conditioning of police officers to follow orders characteristic of many police departments (OLEPA, 1972, p. 9; Savord, 1973, p. 23)

The level of participation in decision-making usually increases as police officers become more familiar with making decisions (Cordrey & Pence, 1972, p. 49). Although there is little discussion in the literature of how officers who are accustomed to obeying orders might more easily participate in decisions, some departments have included group dynamics and decision-making skills in their team policing training programs.

2. *Effects of Team Formation Upon Department Cohesion*. A necessary concern for evaluating effects of team policing is the effect of team organization upon other department units. Several reports of improved department communication resulting from team organization are found in the literature. Improved lateral and vertical communications were reported in Palo Alto, where top management and the patrol force were organized into teams (Zurcher, 1971, p. 56). In Albuquerque and Richmond, improved communications between the investigations division and the patrol force have been reported. This resulted primarily because investigators were assigned to work with the teams (Phelps & Harmon, 1972, p. 3; Sears & Wilson, 1973, p. 51).

Potentially more disruptive in its effects has been the growth of team spirit. One analyst has suggested that team policing, which "lends itself to the novel, informal and the imaginative approach," might produce a "danger of elite units doing their own thing" (O'Brien, 1974, p. 6). Some overpolicing has been noted in one community. Concern for overpolicing led the Albuquerque department to organize its teams by shifts. Their fear was that the neighborhood teams might develop into "little, independent departments" (Sears & Wilson, 1973, p. 44). Even where teams have been organized by shifts, however, competition between teams has posed potential problems. To counter excessive team independence and cohesive-

ness, San Bruno rotates its men between teams every six months (Cann, 1972, p. 64).

Team organizations have affected the attitudes of non-team personnel. A concern expressed by some police commanders has been that team policing might cause a withering of the *esprit de corps* of some of the special divisions - especially the detectives (Police Foundation, 1974, p. 5). Where team policing programs have been established in particular neighborhoods of a city, their effectiveness is dependent upon their ability to function as a separate unit. In other communities resistance to the team by non-team members has been reported to be "almost automatic" (Sherman, Milton & Kelly, 1973, p. 65).

In order to successfully establish a team policing program it is particularly important that the team should work toward the overall goals of the department in order to enlist department-wide support (NACCJSG, 1973, pp. 64–65). The support or resistance of non-team members has been judged "probably the most critical factor in determining the degree of success of team policing" (Sherman, Milton & Kelly, 1973, pp. 62–63).

CHAPTER V. COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES AND IMPACTS OF TEAM POLICING

Team policing is a modern police attempt to reduce [police] isolation and involve community support in the war on crime. The basic idea is that the team learns its neighborhood, its people, and its problems. It is an extension of the "cop on the beat" concept, brought up to date with more men and modern police services. . . . The common goal is improved crime control through better community relations and more efficient organization of manpower. (NACCJSG, 1973, pp. 154; 157)

Citizen support and cooperation with the police are deemed critical to crime prevention and police effectiveness (Myren, 1972, p. 721; NACCJSG, 1973, p. 160; 193). However, as noted by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals report, this support and cooperation were eroded heavily during the 1960's (p. 154). This has been attributed to a number of factors: the increased use of patrol cars and concommitant de-emphasis of foot patrol isolating police from citizen contact; the practice of frequent officer rotation which prevented development of stable police-community relationships; and a growing effort toward police specialization. The changing social climate epitomized by riots and disturbances in large urban centers both aggravated and made clear the deteriorated state of police-community relations.

Recognizing the crucial role of the community, most team policing programs have placed strong emphasis on improving police-community relations and encouraging active citizen involvement in crime prevention (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 55; Davis, 1973, p. 12). This "community emphasis" has taken the form of three basic strategies:

- Stable assignment of officers to fixed geographic areas.
- Police-citizen contact.
- Increased citizen participation in law enforcement activities.

The permanent assignment of officers to fixed areas, referred to as "geographic policing" by the National Advisory Commission in its report *A Strategy to Reduce Crime* (1973, pp. 77–78), implies assigning officers to specific beats or neighborhoods for extended periods of time. It is hoped thereby to increase officer accountability, assumption of responsibility and improve citizen support.

The emphasis on increased positive citizen contacts has taken many forms, such as a return to use of foot patrol, the establishment of community storefront officers for ease of community access to police services, and an increased focus on provision of non-crime services. Examples of such services include referrals to other social agencies, family crisis intervention, establishment of youth athletic groups, etc. Team policing programs undertaking these activities have attempted thereby to increase police visibility and develop citizen support, trust and identity with the police.

Various team policing programs have undertaken a number of activities to increase citizen participation in law enforcement and crime prevention. The organization of community meetings and establishment of citizen advisory boards have led to increasing citizen input into the policy-making process, and the improvement of police sensitivity to the community and its needs. Citizen volunteer assistance has been solicited for crime-specific prevention programs, (such as burglary control) and for participation in auxiliary patrol programs. These activities have increased both the manpower available for law enforcement activities and provided defined roles for community members in crime prevention.

Although each team policing program has differed in the extent of emphasis placed on the various strategies, and in how each strategy has been realized, the activities described above are common to many team policing programs. Table 5–1 presents a listing of the more common activities. It should be noted that few team policing programs have attempted all of these activities. All projects considered to be Neighborhood Team Policing programs, include minimally the feature of stable geographic assignment.

The community-related activities of team policing have been aimed largely toward improving police-community relations - hoping thereby to obtain the citizen support and involvement held critical to successful law enforcement.

Table 5–1

NEIGHBORHOOD OR COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

STRATEGY	ACTIVITY
Permanent Assignment	• Officers work in a defined neighborhood for an extensive period
Service-Orientation and Increased Citizen Contact	• Referral and "special" services • Storefront headquarters • Officer participation in community activities • Walk and talk programs • Foot and scooter patrol • Non-aggressive patrol tactics • Informal "blazer" uniform • Specially marked cars
Increased Citizen Participation in Law Enforcement	• Citizen volunteer programs • Crime prevention programs • Citizen advisory councils • Community meetings

Most programs have documented in one form or another whether the community related activities actually were implemented - e.g. the number assigned to foot patrol; the number of citizen contacts made; or the number of business establishments contacted in a crime prevention program. These measure, however, only the amount of effort expended by team officers, rather than the effects of their activities.

Effectiveness information is much scarcer in the literature. Numerous team policing programs have, however, attempted to collect it. Evaluation data, for example, has been collected on such factors as number of assaults on police; degree of citizen crime reporting; citizen fear of crime; citizen requests for police services; citizen attitudes toward the police; police attitudes toward the community and citizens; type and frequency of media reporting; and citizen victimization. Few programs, of course, have collected all of this information. The Urban Institute evaluation has made the most extensive effort to measure the effects anticipated. They examined police records and conducted several thousand pre- and post-survey interviews with citizens, business men and police officers.

A. Permanent Assignment of Officers

The most significant attribute of team policing programs has been the permanent assignment of patrol officers to specific patrol beats, or neighborhoods. This represents a significant departure from the conventional practice in urban areas of periodic rotation of officers, both by shift and by beat.

Team policing advocates have argued that stable assignment of police personnel to a neighborhood has a number of positive effects on the community and on police-community relations. Citizens begin to get to know, identify with, and have confidence in "their" police officers (Murphy & Bloch, 1970, p. 18). Long-term relationships are established, promoting citizen trust and a willingness on the part of citizens to report suspicious circumstances and criminal activity. Neighborhood assignment is purported to have certain effects on the individual officer as well. This usually entails increasing the officer's identification with, personal involvement in, and sense of responsibility for the neighborhood (Davis, 1973, p. 13; Sardino, 1971, p. 19). Wilson and McLaren (1972, p. 328) reinforce the idea that permanent assignment attaches the officer to the community that he patrols. They argue that frequent personnel shifts can detract from the officer's and squad's accountability for what happens in a duty area. They make it clear that a responsible chief must keep his men in permanent assignment and hold them accountable for police service and crime in their patrol area.

Aside from allowing a police administrator to hold individual officers and team responsible for police service in a community, stable assignment provides certain advantages for the officer. Stable assignment permits the officer to become familiar with an area and its trouble

spots, enabling recognition of unexpected changes and facilitating crime detection and apprehension (Murphy & Bloch, 1970, p. 18; Sears & Wilson, 1973, p. 49). Wilson and McLaren (1972, p. 328) have labeled permanent assignment to a beat as resulting in "the highest quality of patrol service". They go on to point out how frequent beat changes prevent officer acquaintance with the "persons, hazards, and facilities" on his beat, and "interfere with continuity of service". Finally, stable neighborhood assignment, by permitting an officer to become familiar with a community, is expected to increase the officer's understanding of and sensitivity to the life styles and needs of the community (NCOP, 1973, p. 34; Wasserman, 1973, p. 26). Such sensitivity would not only help avoid misunderstandings leading to poor police-community relations, but also would allow the officer to be more responsive to the community's needs for police services, and individualize these services according to community needs.

The rationale underlying stable geographic assignment and additional neighborhood team policing strategies has been concisely expressed by Myren, in describing the New York Neighborhood Team Policing model. The New York Team Policing experience is based on the assumption that citizen-support,

> which is absolutely necessary for successful policing, can best be achieved by having police subunits permanently assigned to each neighborhood; that the personnel of these subunits must get to know the people in the neighborhood through positive efforts to promote continuous dialogue in both formal and informal settings. (Myren, 1972, p. 721)

1. *Effects of Stable Assignment.* Evaluation information concerning the effects of stable assignment on citizen attitudes, police and crime is sketchy. Reports have cited that citizen attitudes have improved (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 62, Davis, 1973, p. 18; Sears & Wilson, 1973, p. xxi) as a result of team policing; that community relations have improved (NCOP, 1973, p. 34); and that citizens venture out at night more frequently, indicating less fear of crime (O'Brien, 1974, pp. 7–8; Sardino, 1971, p. 30). A report on Albuquerque's Team Policing program found that officers began to identify with their districts, resulting in gains in community trust and willingness to report suspicious circumstances. Furthermore, when residents would call the police, they tended "increasingly to request by name the officer assigned to patrol their district" (Sears & Wilson, 1973, pp. 49–9). Analysis of the Los Angeles Team Policing program found that

> The establishment of territorial imperative was accomplished in a matter of weeks. Officers became personally involved in protecting *their* piece of ground and developed a kind of paternal attitude toward the area. They became offended when intolerable levels of crime began to occur and considered the continued activity of a particular criminal a direct affront. (Davis, 1973, p. 13)

The Urban Institute, in its one-year report (Schwartz et al., 1975, p. 8), however, failed to note a decrease in fear of crime, or significant change in citizen behavior patterns. Likewise, citizen crime reporting did not change particularly relative to the number of suspicious incidents observed (p. 11). Despite the evidence reported, it is impossible to determine if certain of these results are attributable to stable police assignment, or to other factors such as community relations programs, environmental or economic conditions.

B. Service-Oriented Police-Citizen Contact

A particular emphasis of most team policing programs has been on increasing opportunities for positive police-citizen contact, with the concomittant goals of improving citizen attitudes toward the police (police-community relations) and encouraging the flow of information from the citizenry. With these objectives in mind, team policing programs have tried a variety of tactics.

1. *Provision of Non-Crime Services.* Most neighborhood team policing programs have placed strong emphasis on a service orientation in providing non-crime services as a means of improving the police image and encouraging information flow. The provision of non-crime services is viewed as one of three objectives of police patrol: "Better non-crime services enhance the image and public support of the police department, thereby strengthening crime deterrence and apprehension efforts" (NCOP, 1973, p. 13).

The concept of a community service-oriented police department has been incorporated into many team policing programs as a means of altering the military image of the police. Mintz and Sandler (1974, p. 44) have discussed the concept as instituted in the New York City Police Department:

> Contrary to the technically oriented, man-of-action, letter-of-the law image which once prevailed, the contemporary police officer should be prepared to act as a frontline crisis specialist who is able to serve clients through the application of human relations skills and better coordination of community resources.

Myren (1972, p. 721) notes that the New York version of team policing is based on the assumption

> that assistance to the people, both in handling their crime problems and in helping them to make contact with the proper agencies to handle the myriad other

problems of big city living, is the best means of achieving respect for and support of police operations.

The Police Task Force report (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 15) likewise comments that "to the extent that the police facilitate the delivery of community services, they develop good will and their tasks are performed more easily and effectively".

With that rationale, neighborhood team policing programs have engaged in a wide range of non-crime services, including the referral of citizens to other agencies, the operation of storefront offices and the deployment of community service officers. Several programs (e.g. Dayton, Detroit, Albany, Holyoke and Albuquerque) have experimented with establishing neighborhood storefront offices as coordinating centers for their teams' community activities and for the provision of referral services. Other programs (e.g. Arlington), have emphasized development of cooperative arrangements with other social agencies to refer citizens for social aid as an alternative to arrest. In Dayton, for example, the police team contracted with the mental health center of a local hospital to secure specialist help for domestic crisis interventions.

There has been generally little evaluation of the effects of these services as a whole, although storefront operations have had mixed reviews. An Albany storefront operation was attributed with improving informal contacts and police image.

> The storefront headquarters . . . was instantly popular with both young people and adults . . . Its informal atmosphere reduced the unfavorable stereotype of the police station, held by many residents. As a result of this approach, persons entering the storefront are no longer suspiciously viewed by other area residents as traitors cooperating with the police. (McArdle & Betjemann, 1972, p. 10)

In Albuquerque, the storefronts were not counted as either successes or failures. They succeeded in attracting a high caliber of officers for the work, but suffered from insufficient funding and planning. Albuquerque eventually decided, however, to close its storefronts and concentrate its efforts in working with youth through the Police Athletic League Program (Sears & Wilson, 1973, pp. 57–60).

Officer participation in community activities has been encouraged in many programs. Police attendance at community meetings has occurred in the context of certain model cities programs (e.g. Holyoke, Dayton). In other cases, team patrolmen have been involved in organizing special events, picnics, and youth athletic programs to increase positive contacts. There has been little direct evaluation of the effects of police participation in community activities within the context of team policing programs.

There is much debate on exactly how much non-crime services enhance police image. Also debated is whether or not providing non-crime services helps attain traditional law enforcement goals. These debates can be expected to continue until more direct evidence is available.

2. *Walk and Talk Programs; Foot and Scooter Patrol.* Use of foot and scooter patrol has been incorporated into a variety of team policing programs (e.g. Albany, Detroit, New York City, St. Petersburg). In some instances, patrolmen have been assigned to entire foot patrol shifts. Other programs have simply encouraged officers to leave their cars for intermittent periods of foot patrol - i.e. to "walk and talk". Strong emphasis on spending time meeting and getting to know the citizenry has generally accompanied these tactics. Bloch and Specht (1973, pp. 18–21) note at least three such programs where patrol officers are encouraged to leave their cars and talk informally with citizens.

Traditional police theorists have recommended the use of foot patrols only under certain conditions - usually in central business districts for inspection of the security of buildings (Wilson & McLaren, 1972, p. 355). In team policing, however, foot patrolmen have been used on a more extensive basis as a means of developing social contact between the police and the community.

A review of the literature pertaining to English Unit Beat Policing revealed the importance of the foot constable in gaining information about the community. English police analysts believe that the use of foot constables contributes to the collection of information which not only reduces crime but also increases detection rates (Gregory & Turner, 1968, p. 42). In spite of English claims and the initiation of foot patrols in team areas, there is little quantitative information to support or reject the assertion that foot patrols significantly improve community relations and encourage the flow of information to the police.

Support for the use of foot patrols is based upon scattered and fragmentary information. An analysis of the Detroit program noted how "businessmen missed the foot patrol when it was removed, and requested its reinstatement" (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 57). Beyond this anecdote, its effectiveness is thus largely speculative.

Resistance by patrol officers to leaving their cars to meet and talk with citizens has been reported. Officers have referred to this activity as "a degrading form of appeasement" and contrary to tactical principles underlying preventive patrol (NACCJSG, 1973, pp. 159–160). Certainly much has been written against use of foot patrol in terms of efficiency of patrol allocation. As a means for gathering information, however, it seems a reasonable issue for further investigation.

3. *Avoidance of Street Searches and Aggressive Interrogation*. Avoidance of street searches and aggressive interrogations of suspicious-looking persons has been a feature of many urban-c ntered programs. Greater reliance is generally placed on getting information from community members on suspicious persons and occurrences, to provide greater substantiation for confronting persons on suspicion of crime and for making arrests. Alternative preventive tactics, such a, the conduct of building security inspections and public housing complex patrol, are emphasized.

Bloch and Specht (1973) in their review of the nine team policing programs found that only two utilized aggressive street search interrogations. Police-community relations literature strongly advises against the use of field interrogations or "stop and frisk" tactics, because they lead to negative citizen reactions and increased hostility to the police (Bloch & Specht, 1973, p. 8; Bordua, 1972, p. 124; Wasserman et al., 1973, p. 29). Most of the information about street searches and other aggressive tactics advise that their use will alienate the community.

The antithetical nature of aggressive street patrols and team policing is also suggested by the Dayton experience. Prior to implementing team policing, Dayton routinely and vigorously used aggressive street searches to deter crime. As a result of these searches, police-community relations plumetted. When the searches were stopped and the conversion to team policing implemented, there was a noticeable improvement in police-community relations (Cordrey & Pence, 1972, p. 44). Bloch & Specht (1973, p. 8) have suggested that careful investigations can be substituted for street searches and similar tactics that are detrimental to police-citizen rapport. Although further documentation of the effects on the community of street searches needs to be examined, it seems reasonable to assume that they indeed have an adverse effect.

4. *Symbolism and the Informal "Blazer" Uniform*. Effort to change the symbolic image of the police has often accompanied team programs in neighborhoods having a history of police alienation. Special vehicle markings and color schemes have been used in Albany, Dayton, and Los Angeles. These communities have also provided a blazer uniform with a special team crest for team members. Other efforts to use blazers as a means of reinforcing the professional and service image of the police, have been reported in San Bruno and Menlo Park, California, in Lakewood, Colorado and in St. Petersburg, Florida. Most of these experiments have been based upon the assumption that the informal uniform would increase citizen identification with the police, decrease police-citizen isolation, and enhance communication with the public.

Some police officials have argued against the nonmilitary type uniform on the assumption that if officers were not in the traditional and familiar uniform, they would be difficult to identify and distinguish from ordinary citizens. Chief Cizanckas, of Menlo Park, could only identify three minor incidents in which the identity of an officer was questioned. In addition,

> [during 1970 there was] a 29.1 percent decrease in assaults on officers and we have not had a lost time assault on an officer wearing a blazer. During the six months preceeding the experiment, five officers were briefly hospitalized after being assaulted in the old blue uniform. (Cizanckas, 1971, pp. 45–46)

It is impossible to determine whether the drop in assaults can be attributed directly to the blazer. It is possible that the blazer is merely a symbolic gesture of Menlo Park's total team policing program and part of its emphasis upon improving police-community relations.

In terms of additional positive results reported, the use of special markings on vehicles of the Los Angeles "Team 28" has been credited with causing citizens to begin to refer to the Team as "their police department" (Davis, 1973, pp. 15–6). Several other programs have noted positive community response to the vehicles and blazer uniforms (Bloch & Specht, 1973, p. 33; Koverman, 1974, p. 19). One department also mentioned that there had been initial resistance to the uniform experiment and peer pressure brought against it (Cizanckas, 1971, p. 45).

C. Citizen Participation in Law Enforcement

Achieving greater citizen involvement in law enforcement activities has been a goal of numerous team policing programs. Individual departments have encouraged such involvement in a variety of ways, and to differing degrees. Some departments have developed crime prevention programs in conjunction with local businessmen and residents. Others have used volunteers to perform noncrime type patrol activities, or worked with citizen advisory boards to develop a community-oriented approach to law enforcement. Most programs have attempted to elicit greater citizen support in crime reporting and other forms of informal participation.

1. *Citizen Advisory Councils*. Advocates of team- and community-oriented policing have often suggested that citizen advisory boards be established to insure that citizens are represented when policy and programs are being developed (Angell, 1973, pp. 229–30; Igleburger et al., 1973, p. 76). Several cities, including Dayton, Ohio and San Jose, California have used advisory boards to better

tailor police service to community needs. Although no systematic review of evaluation of the impact to these advisory boards is available, a number of assertions have been made concerning their value to the police and the community.

- It offers citizens an opportunity to comment on, and often to influence, important police matters.
- It gives an opportunity for police officers and citizens to sit together in a problem-solving setting and to explore one another's views.
- The police officers gain a greater appreciation of citizen views.
- Citizens derive a better understanding of the complex police job. (Wasserman et al., 1973, p. 21)

Although police advisory boards and police-community dialogue have been singled out as desirable activities to foster cooperation, they have the potential for a reverse effect. Citizens have criticized those programs which fail to give appropriate and adequate power to citizen representatives on the board. Citizens have complained that police, rather than community representatives, structure the meetings, and that controversial issues are avoided (Myren, 1972, p. 722).

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice has commented that strained police-community relations on an advisory board can be detrimental to an entire community relations program. In one community the Institute found that

> a community relations project was virtually destroyed because it became embroiled in the issue of community control . . . Members of the advisory committee demanded more power than the department was prepared to relinquish and much bitter feeling resulted. (NILECJ, 1973, p. 27)

Although various team policing programs have sought to establish citizen advisory boards, on the whole, greater emphasis seems to have been placed on getting citizen input through community meetings organized by the individual teams. The effects of both of these activities within the context of team policing remains to be evaluated.

2. *Citizen Volunteer Programs*. The channeling of citizen volunteers into law enforcement activities has characterized numerous programs. Some neighborhood teams, e.g. New York City, have enlisted and coordinated volunteer (auxiliary) patrols. The individual volunteers have been given police radios or assigned to patrol cars, and acted as observers to bring suspicious circumstances to police attention. The Venice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department set up a particularly extensive program of neighborhood Block Captains, to serve as information conduits between citizens and the police. In Dayton, a separate Neighborhood Assistance Officer program based on community volunteers was established alongside the team policing program. The assistance officers were residents of the community who volunteered to perform patrol duties and to assist the regular patrolman on his beat. Dayton officials, in reaction to the program, claimed it had several benefits. The assistance officer kept regular patrolmen informed about community problems and, in addition, was able to inform the community on law enforcement problems. Dayton officials also found that community residents were gradually shifting some of the responsibility for excess crime conditions away from the police (OLEPA, 1972, p. 8). The increased community exposure to the police team through the program was credited with responsibility for that shift.

The solicitation of volunteer assistance in crime-specific prevention programs (e.g. burglary prevention) has been a feature of team policing programs. Crime prevention programs like security inspections and property identification alert citizens to the threat of crime and enable them to take positive action. When Team 28 was set up in the Venice section of Los Angeles, team members embarked upon an extensive program to educate citizens about the threat of burglary and ways in which they could protect themselves and their neighborhoods from burglars. Although the program was initiated by the police, informal citizen groups formed to alert their friends and neighbors. Rather dramatic results were claimed for the program, including a reduction in crime, an increase in crimes solved due to citizen assistance, and an improvement in police-community relations (Davis, 1973, p. 14). As noted in the report, "several inveterate felons . . . remarked that they had moved to new turf . . . due to the fact that an aroused citizenry had made their activities too difficult."

Evaluation of these programs is difficult and virtually non-existent. In spite of this, it seems plausible that the use of citizen volunteers aids in reducing crime and provides the department with a tool to improve relations with the public.

D. Summary

Results reported on the effectiveness of community related team policing activities have been mixed. Although specific effects of certain activities have been reported, most of the effects of community related team policing activities on the community, police, or crime have not been traceable to any particular activity or strategy implemented by the program. Results are simply reported as effects of team policing programs generally.

In many cases, as well, the nature of the evaluation conducted has made it questionable whether the effects perceived can even be attributed to the team policing program. A more complete discussion of the problems in evaluating team policing activities appears in the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER VI. EVALUATION OVERVIEW

Previous chapters have described the main activities involved in implementing team policing as an organizational and community relations strategy. The assumed effects of these activities and the actual evaluation results reported in the literature have also been presented. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for examining the specific results which have been attributed to team policing. Attention will focus on the nature of the evaluation effort reported in the literature, the limitations of that literature, and the specific problems associated with evaluating team policing.

A. Nature of the Evaluation Effort and Results

The rationale for evaluating a program such as neighborhood team policing is to collect valid information about the conduct of the program and its short and long-range effects. Evaluations can be of many types - case study designs, quasi-experiments, full experimental designs with random sampling and control groups, or cost-benefit analyses, to name a few. Each type of evaluation is intended to serve a particular purpose - provide a particular type of information.

Some of the more general problems of evaluation occur when either the evaluation design is poor, not implemented as intended, or inappropriate to the purpose of the evaluation. If evaluation information is invalid or misinterpreted and then used by decision-makers in deciding whether to initiate, modify, or terminate a program, inappropriate decisions may result. Good programs may be terminated, or never started. It is thus extremely important to know what kinds of evaluations have been conducted, and the type of probable accuracy of the evaluation information available.

1. *Inadequacy of Existing Studies.* Evaluation studies of team policing have been few in number and varying in quality. Evaluation reports have ranged from anecdotal records of the impressions of participants written up by the police chief and case study descriptions, to detailed reports of large-scale, multi-year evaluations conducted by outside evaluators making use of expensive and systematic data collection methodologies and experimental research designs.

Two reviewers of team policing projects have noted the inadequacies of most of the program evaluations, e.g. the anecdotal nature of the information, the lack of "scientifically satisfactory" results (Bloch & Specht, 1973, p. 1) and the failure to "measure the amount of real crime in the team areas" (Sherman et al., 1973, p. 100). As one author notes,

> generally the evaluations were plagued by poorly specified objectives; poorly chosen (or no) control or comparison groups or areas; failure to gather baseline, or 'before' data; poorly designed data collection questionnaires, and weak quality control over interviews. (Sherman et al., 1973, pp. 100–101)

Although these criticisms are valid, in view of the limited nature of the existing literature, it should be noted that both of the above reviews are somewhat dated and include only a small number of the team policing projects currently underway (twelve out of the possible sixty presently identified). More recent evaluation studies may provide possible exceptions.

The Urban Institute evaluation of the Cincinnati Team Policing program has been pinpointed in the literature as a general exception to the "inadequate evaluation" rule. According to Sherman (1973, p. 101), the Cincinnati evaluation "is the nearest thing to a model for evaluating team experiments" that exists. The Urban Institute evaluators themselves note the anticipated value of the survey instruments developed for the Cincinnati evaluation as a "standard prototype for evaluating citizen attitude and experience elsewhere," and expect that the evaluation design will be used in other cities (Clarren & Schwartz, 1974, pp. 15; 17).

It is apparent that their intent is not only to evaluate the Cincinnati COMSEC program, but also to make a significant methodological contribution to the overall evaluation of police performance. The results of the Cincinnati study, which are "mixed" at the six-month and first-year stages (Schwartz et al., 1975, pp. 3–5), may prove to be more significant in terms of evaluation methodology than in terms of conclusions about team policing.

2. *Inadequacy of the Evaluation Results.* Because of

the fluctuating quality of the evaluation studies, the resultsreported are of questionable validity. What results do exist range from reports of positive and rapid changes of the type anticipated, to lack of results and results contrary to expectations. Most results reported, however, have been of a positive nature.

In that context, it is interesting to note the mixed results of the Cincinnati project, which is the most comprehensive evaluation undertaken to date. While it cannot be demonstrated at this point that there is a relationship between type of results reported and evaluation methodology, this may prove to be the case as further evaluation evidence is examined, and the studies are subjected to methodological critique. This will come, however, at a later project phase.

B. Problems

Many of the evaluation studies have been termed inadequate and their results invalid because of their failure to take into account some specific problems associated with implementing team policing or evaluating police performance generally. Specific examples of the types of problems include the inadequacy of measures of goal attainment with regard to police performance; the problem of confounding; the costliness of major systematic evaluation efforts; the political constraints; and the lack of evaluation impact on decision-making. Each of these problems will be discussed briefly below.

1. *Inadequacy of Measures of Goal Attainment.* Team policing has a number of goals - primary among them being the reduction of crime and the improvement of police-community relations. The crux of the evaluation problem is one of getting valid and reliable criteria of goal attainment.

Most indices of police performance (e.g. reported crime rates, citizen attitudes, clearance rates) have been subject to major criticism. The usefulness of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, as a measure of crime rate, has been discounted for measuring only reported crime and failing to measure police performance (Elliott, 1969, p. 35; Maltz, 1974, p. 132; NCOP, 1973, p. 7; Ostrom & Parks, 1973, p. 372). Routine police records (e.g. arrest rates, clearance rates) have been criticized as inadequate for their tendency to reflect the department's incentive system and internal pressures to increase productivity (NCOP, 1973, pp. 22–3; Ostrom & Parks, 1973, p. 378; Skolnick, 1967, pp. 168–74). Even victimization studies, which have been held up as one excellent, though expensive, solution in determining "true" crime rates, are liable to criticism unless a seriousness index is included (Clarren & Schwartz, 1974, p. 14). There is disagreement, as well, over the use of citizen evaluations of police performance (Smith & Ostrom, 1974, p. 50), although the rationale for their use is strongly backed.

Another aspect of the measurement problem relates to the fact that law enforcement practices are only one factor influencing crime rate or citizen attitudes. Ostrom (1973, p. 97) remarks on the many other activities which contribute to community security, including the employment market and the court and corrections system. How the court system handles the output of police services (arrested suspects), for example, may have a more powerful influence on crime rates than the number of arrests made.

A third measurement problem arises when trying to determine the appropriate direction of change of certain measures, and in interpreting the results of evaluations (Kelling, 1974, p. 150). For example, will team policing cause citizen fear of crime to increase or decrease? It could be that team policing crime prevention programs, by increasing citizen awareness of crime, will increase citizen fear of crime (Schwartz et al., 1975, p. 8).

There is no "simple answer" to the problem of measuring the outcomes of team policing programs. The more extensively planned and conducted evaluation studies (e.g. the Cincinnati study) have used multiple measures to try to counterbalance the anticipated inaccuracies of any single measure. Crime rates reported from victimization studies have been preferred over use of rates reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. The "measurement" problem will not, however, be soon resolved.

2. *Confounding: The Problem of Intervening Variables.* Another significant measurement problem for team policing is that of the confounding of dependent and independent variables, resulting in an inability to distinguish the program or strategy to which the evaluation results should be attributed. This has been caused by a number of factors in the implementation of team policing programs, including the introduction of team policing as only one of several concurrently initiated innovations; the uniqueness of team policing programs; the introduction of team policing programs as demonstration projects in only one section of most cities; and the novelty of the programs.

In several cities (e.g. Dayton, Los Angeles) team policing was only one of several concurrently introduced changes (Cordrey & Pence, 1972, p. 49; Davis, 1973, p. 12). This has created the particular difficulty of knowing whether it was team policing, one of the other programs, or a combination of the two programs which led to the results reported.

An additional problem has been presented by the uniqueness of team policing programs. Program goals,

features, and implementations have varied widely from city to city. No two programs have been alike. This has negated comparative analysis. Most evaluations have necessarily been conducted as single-shot case studies, and the results have not been generalizable.

The novelty of team policing as an innovation has had several effects on its evaluation. Because there has been limited time and opportunity for evaluation, many of the results are not yet reported. But the real problems lie elsewhere. The evaluation of a program in its initial stages may, first of all, report more about the success or failure of the change process (the management style of the administrator) in implementing team policing than about the effects of the program itself. Secondly, the introduction of change and/or participant expectations of improvement inherent in a "new" program may cause an initial appearance of success.

The fact that most team policing programs have been initiated as demonstration projects in only one sector of a city must also be taken into account when interpreting evaluation results. The results of a program initiated on a limited scale in one area of a city may not reflect the results of program implementation city-wide. For example, the program may only be "moving" crime to another section of the city.

3. *Costliness of Experimental Evaluations*. The type of systematic, experimental evaluation required to get valid information about the effects of team policing is very expensive. This occurs not only because of the tendency to use victimization studies to get a more accurate view of the "real" crime rate, but also because of the necessity of using control groups.

The Police Foundation has committed $800,000 over a three-year period to the Cincinnati evaluation of team policing and, even at that rate, the Urban Institute reports that "tradeoffs had to be made," and the survey sample size cut to stay within the evaluation budget (Clarren & Schwartz, 1974, p. 3). Since Cincinnati has been viewed as a "model evaluation" in the team policing area, such a cost is highly significant.

4. *Political Constraints and Lack of Evaluation Impact*. Team policing evaluations have been subject to numerous political constraints. Such constraints are inherent in all evaluations, to a greater or lesser degree. The operation of these constraints can, however, be a critical factor influencing the validity and use of evaluation results. Since a main purpose of evaluation is to provide information for decision-making, the degree to which the results of an evaluation affect the decision to retain or modify a program is a prime factor in assessing the usefulness of an evaluation effort.

Political constraints can impact in a number of ways. First, resistance to evaluation and its costs can prevent the evaluator from being able to implement a rigorous evaluation design, or severely limit its scope. Evaluators are frequently called in at a late stage in a project, when it is far too late to gather baseline data. Participants can refuse to cooperate or deliberately "fix" the evaluation results by over- or under-reporting crime or complaints, to make a program appear successful or unsuccessful. Or the evaluation results can be rejected by the decision-maker, for any number of reasons. (It should be recalled at this point that program evaluations are often a condition of receiving federal grant money, rather than an undertaking welcomed by the grant recipient. A grant recipient may only perceive the potential threat to his funding, rather than the possible benefits of the effort.)

Throughout the team policing literature thus far reviewed, there has been little discussion of either the constraints or the impacts of team policing evaluation. One author realistically mentioned the effects that evaluation apparently did *not* have.

> Whenever the first phase of a team policing project ended, the police administrator made a decision about the future of the team project: whether it should be continued, expanded, or discontinued. The effect of the evaluation's findings on that decision was usually quite small, for a number of reasons. First, evaluation often did no more than "prove" what the police administrator already "knew" (intuitively) about team policing, e.g. "the community loves it" or "the other patrolmen hate it." Second, the evaluators themselves often had poor credibility, if not with the police administrator, then with the department. Third, many outside political factors, of necessity, were brought to bear on that "administrative" decision. (Sherman et al., 1973, p. 102)

It is not surprising that the team policing literature presents such little mention of either constraints or evaluation impacts, since neither are generally made public. The political constraints of program evaluation are critical to the success of an evaluation, however, and particularly as they influence the use of evaluation results. They should not be ignored.

5. *Summary and Critique*. The review of the evaluation results reported in the team policing literature has indicated a range of results achieved, although most reports are positive. There have been a number of problems associated with evaluating team policing that bring into question the validity of these results - problems related to the inadequacy of evaluation measures; inability to attribute results to specific programs or strategies (confounding); economic constraints; and political constraints. There is no report of team policing evaluations impacting on decision-making.

Given these problems, and the limited nature of the available evaluation literature (in both number and quality), it seems questionable that much weight should be placed at this point on any reports of the impacts of team policing programs, whether positive, negative, or negligible.

There is, however, much valuable information to be gleaned from the program descriptions and the reports of the problems encountered in attempting to implement team policing programs.

CHAPTER VII. TRAINING FOR TEAM POLICING

Many police departments that have studied or implemented team policing programs have recognized that team policing requires additional training and the acquisition of new skills by management and officers.

In a limited review of pre-start up training for team policing, the researchers have noted that these programs involve not simply additional training but new types of training designed to meet the particular needs of team policing. Two basic elements of team policing demand deviation from the conventional methods and content of police training.

- the participative nature of team policing which places considerable responsibility upon the first line supervisor and the patrolman to help design and implement a police program for their assignment area.
- the community oriented or neighborhood focus of team policing which demands of the officer a more intimate knowledge of his assignment area and its people.

Students of police training and education have long recognized that certain police training practices are unrelated to the realities of actual police operations and the street environment. The atmosphere of many training programs, where the recruit is expected to unquestionably accept and memorize a series of facts to guide his actions, is detrimental to both traditional and team policing modes of operation. The reliance upon fact, and the passive student demeanor expected of recruits, bears only scant resemblance to the operational atmosphere in which the officer will eventually work. Police practitioners and analysts have rightfully observed that the police officer's faith in facts and simplistic answers to complex problems fostered in most academies "is not consistent with the developing perception and goal of the police officer as a thoughtful, autonomous and highly discretionary person" (Boer & McIver, 1973, p. 164; Wasserman & Couper, 1974, p. 127). James Q. Wilson, in his *Varieties of Police Behavior*, has also noted that "recruits are selected and trained in ways that often bear little relationship to their inevitable responsibilities" (Wilson, 1973, p. 219).

The implementation of team policing programs has brought to the forefront what many trainers have long denied - that police work demands of the officer the ability to find solutions to very complex problems and to make decisions in systematic and analytic ways. Team policing training programs have generally recognized the fact that the officer, and especially first-line supervisors, must not only exercise discretion and judgment when dealing with their constituents, but must also develop group skills that will enable them to be active participants in planning and carrying out the goals of their team policing units.

A. The Community as a Focus of Training

Police training programs have usually placed considerable emphasis upon inculcating the recruit with information about the organization of the department and its procedures. Scant attention has been paid to the other constituents of the police officer. Wasserman and Couper have observed that

> Because many police do not see their profession relating directly to their community, no reason is seen for involving the community in the training process. Training programs emphasize technical skill development; little attention is paid to cultural differences, ethnic background, and the complex role police play in determining the quality of life in our urban centers. (Wasserman & Couper, 1974, p. 129)

Perhaps more than any single factor, team police programs have made community focus the heart of their training efforts. The degree to which officers have been exposed to community problems, organizations and needs far exceeds the extent to which these same officers have been offered an opportunity to improve the leadership and group problem-solving skills. This concern with the community is, perhaps, a reflection of the sites that have been selected for team policing experiments. Albany, New York and Cincinnati, Ohio implemented the team approach in high-crime problem areas where police-community relations were severely strained.

Police administrators implementing team policing programs have emphasized the need for the officer to thoroughly understand the environment in which he will be working. Albany engaged the New York State Institute of Governmental Executives to design their training program which included over sixty-four hours of work in the

area of community relations (McArdle & Betjemann, 1972, pp. 9–10). The Cincinnati Police Department retained the University of Cincinnati to develop their training program which included group-type discussions, role playing, problem-solving, and community participation. Many of these training sessions were conducted by civilian trainers skilled in human relations work and were held in the team policing neighborhood rather than in the police academy (Goodin, 1972, p. 19). In Dayton the training program lasted four weeks, two of which were devoted to community problems and group dynamics (Cordrey & Pence, 1972, p. 46).

Measuring the impact of group dynamics and community relations training upon the success of a team police project is very difficult because of the interplay of many variables. In most cases evaluators have relied upon the opinions of officers and community residents to guage the success of their total program and to identify specific problem areas. It appears that instruments need to be developed to measure the impact of various training programs and approaches upon police-community relations.

B. The Team as a Focus of Training

The Police: Task Force Report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, recommended that officers assigned to teams be given training in the "theory of group dynamics" and other skills which would enable them to effectively work as a team. Albany, Cincinnati, Dayton and Los Angeles have all included some training or workshops in the areas of group dynamics and human relations. In addition, several social scientists (Boer & McIver, 1973; Thibault & LeBaron, 1974) have developed what they call team building workshops to acquaint officers and supervisors with the skills needed to effectively manage programs requiring patrolmen to participate in planning and management activities. The purposes of these team building workshops are to:

- Set goals and priorities.
- Analyze or allocate the way work is performed.
- Examine the way a group is working; its process, norms, decision-making, communication.
- Examine relationships among the people doing work (Thibault & LeBaron, 1974, p. 74).

Workshops generally require the participants to actively solve job related and real world problems. The trainers design the problem and its setting and then let the participants develop their own solutions. As a result of such workshops, the officer should be developing decision-making skills in a group setting that will enable him to effectively plan and carry out activities in a police team (Boer & McIver, 1973, p. 163). Thibault and LeBaron believe that their workshops have resulted in "more cooperation and far less competitiveness" among officers. They report that officers, as a result of the workshops, have set up committees to deal with a wide range of operational matters (Thibault & LeBaron, 1974, p. 75). Although the details of group dynamics training being used in team policing programs are not clear from our present literature search, it would appear that such training would facilitate team cooperation and coordination at all command levels.

Most police academies rely upon officers and an occassional lawyer or corrections official to provide recruit and in-service training (Wasserman & Couper, 1974, p. 128). Albany, Cincinnati, Dayton and Los Angeles have all used either universities or consultants to help design and carry out some of their team policing training. Most of this training has been in the areas of group dynamics and human relations.

The introduction of team policing may lead to a greater reliance upon "outsiders" to train police officers. In Cincinnati, for example, the introduction of several major new programs has led the department to contract with the University of Cincinnati to provide command and supervisory personnel with a course in the management of change in law enforcement (Police Foundation, 1972, p. 29). The training of officers in group dynamic skills to facilitate team policing is an important issue which needs further investigation. Although the researchers have been unable to locate any studies which assess the impact of group dynamic training on team policing programs, the review of team policing project reports and materials should present a fertile ground from which to address this problem.

C. The Impact of the Team Upon Investigative Training

The decentralization of investigative functions to the team in a variety of modes has been the subject of much discussion. An overview of the merits of the generalist/specialist officer concept found in many team policing programs is presented in another section of this report. Suffice it to say, that team policing programs which decentralize the investigative function have provided their officers with investigative training. The researchers have been unable to locate an evaluation of the impact of decentralizing investigations to the team level. However, the issue is very political. Departments that have decentralized investigations to the team level have usually experienced extreme pressure from the detective division to reverse and curtail this trend.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. HYPOTHESES

Contribution of Team Formation to Efficient Patrol Operations

Hypothesis #1: The Call Response Times of Team-Organized Patrols Are Not Worse Than Those of Traditional Patrols.

Hypothesis #2: Establishing a Policy of Dispatching Team Patrols Only Within Their Assigned Neighborhoods Contradicts the Tendency of Dispatchers to Use Available Officers Wherever Located When Making Assignments.

Hypothesis #3: Compared to the Supervision of Platoon-Organized Patrols, the Supervision of Team-Organized Patrols is Superior.

Hypothesis #4: compared to Patrols Organized Into Platoons, Patrols Organized Into Teams Are More Active.

Hypothesis #5: Compared to Patrols Organized Into Platoons, Patrols Organized Into Teams Are More Easily Mobilized and Coordinated For Group Operations.

Hypothesis #6: The More Complete the Responsibility of Single Patrol Officers For Cases, the Better the Quality of Services Delivered by Police.

Hypothesis #7: The More Widespread the Training of Patrol Officers in Specialties, the Greater the Capabilities of a Police Department For Law Enforcement and Order Maintainance.

Hypothesis #8: The More Complete the Organization of a Police Department Into Teams, the More Efficient Its Management of Its Workload.

Job Satisfaction

Hypothesis #1: The Greater the Achievement by An Innovative Team Policing Program of Its Stated Objectives, the Greater the Job Satisfaction of Participating Police Officers.

Hypothesis #2: Compared to the Satisfaction of Platoon-Organized Patrols With Their Jobs, the Job Satisfaction of Team-Organized Patrols Will be Greater.

Hypothesis #3: The Greater the Involvement in Planning an Innovated Team Policing Program by Participating Officers, the Greater the Satisfaction of Officers With the Program.

Hypothesis #4: The More Stable the Assignment of Officers to Neighborhood Beats, the Greater the Influence of the Neighborhood Upon the Job Satisfaction of Officers.

Hypothesis #5: The More Complete the Assignment of Generalist/Specialist Responsibilities to Patrol Officers, the Greater the Satisfaction of Patrol Officers With Their Jobs.

Generalist/Specialist

Hypothesis #1: The Closer the Supervision of Patrol Officers, the Greater Their Potential For Development as Generalist/Specialists.

Hypothesis #2: The More Protracted the Investigative Effort Required by a Case, the Less Appropriate Its Assignment to a Generalist/Specialist.

Hypothesis #3: The Less Localized the Investigative Effort Required by a Case, the Less Appropriate Its Assignment to a Generalist/Specialist.

Hypothesis #4: The Less Related to Patrol a Police Task, the Less Appropriate Its Assignment to a Generalist/Specialist.

Hypothesis #5: The Less Capable a Department to Reorganize to Allow Its Patrol Officers to Spend Longer Upon Initial Response to Calls Requiring Investigation, the Less Appropriate the Generalist/Specialist Approach For the Department.

Team Supervision And Leadership

Hypothesis #1: The More Complete the Team Leader's Understanding of His Team Leadership Role, the More Effective His Leadership.

Hypothesis #2: The Greater the Provision of In-Service Training and Other Resource Support For Team Patrol Operations, the More Effective the Leaders of Teams.

Hypothesis #3: Compared to the Supervisors of Platoon-Organized Patrols, Team Leaders Are Better Able to Understand Their Men as Individuals.

Hypothesis #4: Compared to the Supervisors of Platoon-Organized Patrols, Team Leaders Have a Better Understanding of the Talents of Their Officers.

Hypothesis #5: Compared to the Supervisors of Platoon-Organized Patrols, Team Leaders Are Better Able to Accommodate the Interests of Their Officers.

Hypothesis #6: Compared to the Supervisors of Platoon-Organized Patrols, Team Leaders Will Tend to Rely Less Upon the Formal Disciplinary Procedures of a Department.

Hypothesis #7: Compared to the Supervisors of Platoon-Organized Patrols, Team Leaders Will Take a Stronger Proprietary Interest in the Careers of Their Officers.

Participative Decision-Making

Hypothesis #1: The More Shared the Understandings of Group Processes of Decision-Making of Team Members, the More Effective the Group Decision-Making Processes of a Team.

Hypothesis #2: The Less Officers Are Conditioned to Respond Unquestioningly to Orders, the More Effective the Group Decision-Making Processes of a Team.

Hypothesis #3: The Greater the Self-Confidence of Officers, the Greater Their Ability to Participate in Group Decision-Making Processes.

Professionalization

Hypothesis #1: The Greater the Sense of Involvement of an Officer in Decision-Making, the Greater the Officer's Sense of Himself as a Professional.

Hypothesis #2: The More Complete the Development of a Patrol Officer as a Generalist/Specialist, the Greater the Officer's Sense of Himself as a Professional.

Hypothesis #3: The Greater the Stress Upon Expertise in the Supervision of a Police Officer, the Greater the Officer's Sense of Himself as a Professional.

Team Formation Effects Upon Department Cohesion

Hypothesis #1: The More Complete the Formation of Officers Into a Team, the Better the Relations Among the Officers Assigned to the Team.

Hypothesis #2: The Less Widespread the General Support For Team Policing in a Police Department, the Greater the Likelihood That Team Policing Will Intensify Intradepartmental Conflict.

Hypothesis #3: The More Widespread the General Support For Team Policing in a Police Department, the Greater the Likelihood That Team Policing Will Improve Intradepartmental Communications.

Hypothesis #4: The More Widespread the Participation in Team Policing Innovation in a Department, the Greater the Potential Contribution of Team

Policing to Improved Department Morale.

Hypothesis #5: Compared to Shift-Organized Police Teams, Neighborhood-Organized Police Teams Are Less Cohesive.

Hypothesis #6: The More Stable the Assignments of Neighborhood Team Patrols to a Single Shift, the Greater the Tendency For Cohesion Among the Officers of the Shift to be Stronger Than Cohesion With Other Officers Assigned to the Neighborhood Team.

Hypothesis #7: The Circulation of Information Acquired by Team Members Will be Greater Within the Team Than With Other Sections of a Department.

Hypothesis #8: The More Unified the Supervision of Police Officers, the Better the Quality of Reporting by Police Officers.

Contributions To Police Accountability

Hypothesis #1: The More Complete the Responsibility of Single Patrol Officers For Follow-Up of Calls Responded to, the More Accountable a Police Organization For Services Delivered.

Hypothesis #2: The More Unified the Supervision of Patrol Officers, the More Accountable a Police Organization For Services Delivered.

Hypothesis #3: The More Unified the Supervision of Delivery of Police Services to Neighborhoods, the More Accountable a Police Organization For Services Delivered.

Hypothesis #4: The More Stable the Assignment of Patrol Officers to Beats, the More Accountable a Police Organization For Services Delivered.

Hypothesis #5: The More Decentralized the Decision-Making of a Police Organization; the More Accountable the Police Organization For Services Delivered.

Contributions To Criminal Apprehension And Crime Deterrence

Hypothesis #1: The More Complete the Development of Officers as Generalist/Specialists, the Greater the Capability of a Department to Retrieve Evidence For Investigations.

Hypothesis #2: The More Unified the Supervision of Police Officers, the Better the Quality of Arrests.

Hypothesis #3: The More Stable the Assignment of Police Officers to Neighborhoods, the Better Informed by Understanding of Neighborhood Crime Problems Are Patrol Operations and the Greater the Effective Visibility of Patrols.

Hypothesis #4: The More Widespread is Voluntary Participation in Neighborhood Crime Control Programs, the Greater Police Apprehension of Criminals.

Hypothesis #5: The More Widespread is Voluntary Participation in Neighborhood Crime Control Programs, the Lower Neighborhood Levels of Crime.

Contributions to Voluntary Citizen Role in Crime Control

Hypothesis #1: The More Unified the Supervision of Delivery of Police Services to Neighborhoods, the Greater the Capability of a Department to Use Voluntary Citizen Assistance.

Hypothesis #2: The More Objective and Policy-Oriented the Regulations of a Police Department, the Greater the capability of the Department to Use Voluntary Citizen Assistance.

Information Flow From Citizens

Hypothesis #1: The More Stable the Assignment of Police Officers to Neighborhoods, the Greater the Importance of Citizen Information in Police Law Enforcement Efforts.

Hypothesis #2: The Greater the Informal Contact of Patrol Officers With Citizens, the Greater the Flow of Information From Citizens to Police.

Hypothesis #3: The Greater the Role of Police in Providing Non-Crime Related Social Services in a Neighborhood, the Greater the Readiness of Citizens of the Neighborhood to Volunteer Information to Police.

Hypothesis #4: The Greater the Informal Contact of Patrol Officers With Citizens, the Greater the Validity of Police Assessments of Information Received.

Hypothesis #5: The Greater the Flow of Information From Citizens, the Less the Dependence of Police Upon Criminal Informants.

Citizen Attitudes Toward Police

Hypothesis #1: The More Stable the Assignment of Police Officers to a Neighborhood, the More Widespread in the Neighborhood Citizen Perception of Identity of Their Interests With Police Law Enforcement Efforts.

Hypothesis #2: The More Widespread is Voluntary Participation in Neighborhood Crime Control Programs, the Better Citizen Attitudes Toward Police in a Neighborhood.

Hypothesis #3: The Greater the Reliance of Police Upon Aggressive Patrol Tactics, the Greater the Alienation of Citizens From Police.

Hypothesis #4: Where Communities Are Alienated From the Police, a New Symbolism For the Police Presence (E.G., Special Uniforms, Specially Identified Patrol Vehicles), Accompanied by Change in Patrol Methods, Can Contribute to Increased Support For Police in the Alienated Community.

Police Attitudes Toward Citizens And Community Involvement

Hypothesis #1: The Greater the Reliance of Police Patrols Upon Aggressive Tactics, the Greater the Alienation of Police From Citizens.

Hypothesis #2: The More Widespread is Voluntary Participation in Neighborhood Crime Control Programs, the Less Alienated Are Police Attitudes Toward Citizens.

Hypothesis #3: The More Stable the Assignment of Police Officers to Neighborhoods, the Greater the Interest of Officers in Neighborhood Needs.

Hypothesis #4: The More Stable the Assignment of Police Officers to Neighborhoods, the Greater the Identifications of Officers With the Neighborhoods Patrolled.

Hypothesis #5: The More Stable the Assignment of a Police Officer to a Neighborhood, the Greater the Officer's Patrol Activity in the Neighborhood.

Corruption of Team-Organized Police

Hypothesis #1: The Greater the Development of Team Supervisors as Leaders, the Less the Corruption of Team Officers.

Hypothesis #2: The Greater the Development of an Officer's Sense of Himself as a Professional, the Less the Potential For Corruption of the Officer.

Hypothesis #3: The More an Officer's Sense of Himself as a Professional is Reinforced by His Interactions With Other Officers, the Less the Potential For Corruption of the Officer.

Hypothesis #4: The Greater the Accountability of a Team For Services Delivered, the Less the Potential For Corruption of Team Officers.

Training For Team Policing

Hypothesis #1: The Greater the Change in Organizational Style a Team Policing Program is Intended to Produce, the More Required For Program

Success is Extensive Retraining of Department Personnel.

Hypothesis #2: The Greater the Responsibilities For Planning Team Leaders and Officers Are Expected Jointly to Assume, the More Important is Training in Group Dynamics and Problem-Solving For Team Leaders and Officers.

Hypothesis #3: The Greater the Intent For Team Supervisors to be Leaders, the More Important is Training For Supervisors in Concepts of Team Leadership.

Hypothesis #4: The Greater the Intent of a Team Policing Program to Change Police Relations With a Community, the More Important is Training For Officers in Sociology.

Hypothesis #5: Compared to Shift-Organized Teams, the Scheduling of Uniform In-Service Training For Neighborhood-Organized Teams is More Complicated.

APPENDIX B. THE SYSTEMS CONTEXT OF TEAM POLICING PROGRAMS

Team policing has been advocated as a response to organizational and community issues confronting police. We have identified six types of system issues which team policing programs potentially address. These issues are:

- Changing demands of communities for police service.
- Increasing community involvement in crime control.
- Remedying community relations problems created by existing police organizations.
- Supervising more effectively the delivery of police services.
- Coordinating and using patrol manpower more effectively.
- Making patrol an attractive career for police officers.

We stress that team policing programs are not the only contexts in which police departments address these issues. Nor may all of these system issues be addressed by a single program. The issues are more general. They concern the relationships of the police agencies to their clientele, to their staff, and to their goals. Whether team policing programs address these issues more effectively than some alternatives is one major issue in assessing team policing.

A. Changing Demands of Communities For Police Service

In urban ghettos, during the late sixties, the alienation of communities from police became intense even in communities which did not experience riots. Thus, while the demand for police services has been increasing, the conditions of service delivery have been declining. A recent survey has suggested that the poor of urban ghettos are more likely both to be concerned about crime and to be critical of police (LEAA, 1974, 28).

It is in these neighborhoods, furthermore, that police are called upon most frequently to intervene in situations where their authority to intervene to restore order is most tenuous - in family, landlord-tenant, and businessman-customer disputes. The effectiveness of police in these situations depends mainly upon their ability to perceive and act upon social cues. The authority of police to arrest for disturbing the peace or disorderly conduct is often irrelevant (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 14; Wilson, 1973, pp. 208–209).

One approach to this problem stimulating interest among police administrators has been to use self-consciously the law enforcement discretion of police to develop police service programs responsive to community needs (Davis, 1973, p. 18; Igleburger et al., 1973, pp. 76–78; Zurcher, 1971, p. 56).* Team policing has appealed to these administrators as an organizational approach lending itself to selective law enforcement policies. The teams accountable for police service delivery are identifiable targets for community feedback.

B. Increased Community Involvement in Crime Control

An important constraint upon police efforts to control crime is citizen discretion and readiness to call police (Reiss, 1971, pp. 65–76). Police budget and manpower constraints limit police abilities to control crime through their own efforts.

The main alternative deterrence strategy upon which police can rely is to raise the probability that offenders will be apprehended (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 160). Team policing can involve larger numbers of police officers in efforts to gain citizen help. Neighborhood-organized police units more readily can use the assistance volunteered.

*That police enforcement of the law is in fact selective, appears to be a generally recognized view. See Wilson, 1968, pp. 83–119; Skolnick, 1966, p. 165. Four categories of police discretionary situations are commonly distinguished: 1) discretionary situations created by the arising allocation problems from the limited police resources for law enforcement; 2) discretionary situations arising from the limited capabilities of the criminal justice; 3) discretionary situations arising from the desire of the legislative authority that certain laws not be enforced; and 4) discretionary situations arising from the inappropriateness or likely ineffectiveness of an invocation of the law in a particular situation: unnecessary hardship which invocation of the law would cause an offender or disruption of some law enforcement system police seek to maintain, an informant network, for instance.

C. Remedying Community Relations Problems Created by Existing Police Organizations

The currently prevailing model of police organizations is quasi-military,* based upon sociologist Max Weber's rational-mechanical theory of organization codified during the thirties into principles of administration (Gulick & Urwick, 1937; Weber, 1958). But the original appeal of this model for police administrators probably originates in the military experience which most police have had.

An apparent analogy between military and police organizations exists in that both are instruments of social force which must be prepared to respond on occasions which are unpredictable. Yet the main significance of this analogy may be to rationalize the commitment of police administrators to the model. Police administrators have sought to be free of outside interference. Since most police have had military experience, police administrators have not needed to call upon outside technical assistance in using the model.

A most conspicuous result of the applications of this model in police work has been the division of police departments into specialist units: investigations, traffic, juveniles, vice, etc. The familiar consequence in police departments as elsewhere has been the creation of continually elaborating hierarchies of status which have inhibited the flexibility of police organizations.

An additional problem of the specialist-based organization more peculiar to police organizations has been the tendency for those deployments of these specialists in ways which provoke community hostility. For example, because urban street crime is concentrated in ghettos, organizing special patrol forces to deal with street crime has the effect of introducing a saturating force of specialist patrolmen ignorant of the neighborhood and needlessly antagonistic in their patrol methods (Cordrey & Pence, 1972, p. 44). Team policing organization, in contrast, by providing for the long-term assignment of patrolmen to specific neighborhood, can avoid this kind of problem.

Forming police into units of task specialists has also had the unwitting effect of permitting and possibly even encouraging criminal activity in fields outside the task domain of the particular specialized unit. This result has been produced by the need of the police specialists to maintain good relations with their informants, normally addicts engaged in crime. Communication between the various task specialist units is commonly minimal, occurring normally only when a division has lost confidence in one of its informants (Skolnick, 1966, pp. 129–120). The effect of this state of affairs is probably a lower rate of criminal apprehension. The generalist and neighborhood emphases of team policing organization promise some control upon these tendencies.

Where police organizations have achieved strict internal regulations and have implemented statistical standards for evaluating police performance, the effects may be to prevent administrative control or promotion of effective police interaction with citizens. Bittner's description of this problem is especially striking:

> Though the explicit departmental regulations contain little more than pious sermonizing about police dealings with citizens, whether they be offenders, an unruly crowd, quarreling spouses, accident victims, or what not, it is possible that a policeman could, despite his discretionary freedom, act in some such way as to actually come into conflict with some stated rule, even though the rule is not topically relevant to the situation at hand. Since he knows that his conduct will be judged solely with respect to this point, he must be attuned to it, avoiding the violation even if that involves choosing a course of action that is specifically wrong with respect to the realities of the problem. . . .
>
> As long as there are two forms of accounting, one that is explicit and continually audited (internal discipline), and another that is devoid of rules and rarely looked into (dealings with citizens), it must be expected that keeping a positive balance in the first might encourage playing loose with the second. The likelihood of this increases proportionately to pressures to produce. Since it is not enough that policemen be obedient soldier-bureaucrats, but must, to insure favorable consideration for advancement, contribute to the arrest total, they will naturally try to meet this demand in ways that will keep them out of trouble (1970, pp. 56–57).

Police supervisors in quasi-military organizations have been attuned to internally generated demands and standards of performance. Middle-level leaders in such organizations have been effectively insulated from community contact. Only the chief has been obligated to contend with politicians and pressure groups (Igleburger, Angell, & Pence, 1973, pp. 88–89). Team policing has the potential for reorienting police toward the communities which they serve.

D. Supervising More Effectively the Delivery of Police Services

A particulary subversive effect of the quasi-military

* Myren (1972, p. 720) suggests that complete application of this model has actually been rare, that the model is actually to be found only in a relatively few middle-sized departments whose personnel practices are regulated by honest civil service systems. Social relationships, political ties, and corruption commonly prevent realization of the ideal. This observation would suggest that the human relations efforts of the model within police departments has been in part the result of the significance of the model as an ideal which *should* be governing the relations among police department personnel. Its efforts to that extent have been upon the sort of relationship which supervisors and subordinates have felt they ought to be developing and upon the type of human interaction for which they have been most open.

form of organization has been erosion of police capabilities for leadership. The long chains of command created in the departments most effectively implementing the quasi-military style have created conditions where the distortion of messages becomes practically inevitable (Downs, 1967, pp. 140–143). The military control techniques applied have been used to regulate those aspects of police work which can be observed and thus regulated readily. The effects have been bodies of regulations concentrating upon regulation of aspects of the police task largely irrelevant to police dealings with citizens (Bittner, 1970, p. 174).

Promulgating such regulations and evaluating the reports which they have generated have clogged the organizational communications channels which police administrators have had available, effectively precluding all other administrative feedback upon which police administrators might rely (Bittner, 1970, pp. 67–68).

This situation is aggravated by the inescapable dependence of first line and mid-level police supervisors upon their subordinates' loyalty. Since precise regulation limits supervisory discretion, the main activities through which supervisors have been able to seek their subordinates' good will have been cover-ups of their mistakes. The least regulated aspects of the police task, the aspects where police departments depend most upon supervisory intervention for effective police performance, have been the main arena for this unfortunate use of supervisory discretion (Bittner, 1970, pp. 59–60; Sherman, Milton, & Kelly, 1973, p. 80).

These appeasing supervisory efforts have not affected the tendency for police in quasi-military departments to regard their supervisors with fear or contempt. Police leaders have been looked upon as disciplinarians exclusively, persons who can do things to their men, but not much for them. Unlike military men, police leaders have not had frequent opportunities to gain respect by leading their men in the field (Bittner, 1970, pp. 59–60). Police administrators have been encouraged to "think in terms of leadership in ideas and concepts, in energy and enthusiasm, and in high principles and integrity" (Wilson & McLaren, 1972, p. 109). The subordinate responses encouraged in a quasi-military organization discourage these possibilities.

Any efforts to overcome the inadequacies of current police supervision necessarily must have two effects: different supervisory roles providing a basis for leadership must be created, and regulations must be used to establish goals rather than constraints. Each of these efforts involves altering the basis of accountability within police organizations. Supervisors cannot be held accountable for goals unless policies for achieving these goals are spelled out in ways acknowledging the discretion of supervisors to contribute to their realization. Nor can they be held accountable if the uses of discretion conferred upon them cannot make any difference.

Organizational accountability depends upon the expectation that organization units will concentrate upon limited goals (Simon, 1957, p. 13). What is necessary to achieve community accountability is to achieve a form of police organization where decision-making is coordinated with accountability for delivery of police services to communities. The neighborhood emphasis of team policing represents such an alternative basis for the integrated delivery of police services. Decentralizing police organizations to allow for police coordination at the neighborhood level provides a basis for leadership.

E. Coordinating and Using Patrol Manpower More Effectively

The strategies for increased productivity in police organizations are no different than in other organizations. There is need to improve communications among organizational personnel and to improve organizational use of the information gained to allocate resources most effectively.

Using information effectively requires organizational arrangements to ensure that information is shared and that decision making take into account as many relevant considerations as possible. Efforts to achieve these goals commonly are regarded as decentralizing organizational decision-making. The emphasis here is that the effort involved is dual: to increase the number of decisions being made and to use the quantitative increase in organizational decision-making to improve organizational capabilities for making good decisions.

Efforts to promote information sharing and decentralized decision-making face major obstacles in police departments. A norm that information should be shared does not prevail. Systematic information denial has been observed instead (Bittner, 1970, pp. 64–5). Cooperation between different police organizations, between different special units of the same organization, and even between individual police on the same beat has been minimal. Some explanation for this phenomenon is to be found in the evaluative uses of performance statistics by police organizations, and some justification for the secrecy of police can be found in the need of police organizations to develop informants (Bittner, 1970, p. 66; Skolnick, 1966). But this need does not explain the systematic non-sharing among police of basic information about their beats.

Changing the norms of information sharing among police is one special problem with which police organiza-

tions must contend. Better coordination in police departments requires changing the incentives of police to share what they know. Team policing organization is probably not in itself an adequate step to achieve such a change. Changes in performance measures and their use may be needed as well. Yet the potential effect upon police of any organizational experience with group approaches to problem-solving cannot be underrated.

F. Making Police Patrol an Attractive Career for Police Officers

A perception of police patrol now receiving more considered attention is that responding to crime occupies relatively little of the patrolman's time (American Bar Association, 1973, pp. 32–35; Ashburn, 1973, p. 6; Bittner, 1970, p. 29; Wilson, 1968, p. 19). The patrolman is more commonly involved in problems of crisis management. On a twenty-four hour basis, police provide many of the services available through other community agencies. In these roles, the patrolman exercises discretion which the symbolism of his quasi-military rank does not imply.

Police do not question the fact that they do serve as a twenty-four hour social service agency. But differences concerning how police organizations should accommodate their prevalent social role are wide. These different views of the general police function imply different assessments of the importance of police patrol.

Four police conceptions of their social role can be identified:

- A view that the police should be exclusively concerned with *crime deterrence and criminal apprehension*
- A view that the *main role* of the police should be to *deter crime and apprehend criminals* but that providing publicly expected services can contribute to police achievement of crime fighting goals (Mintz & Sandler, 1974, p. 44; NACCJSG, 1973, p. 15; NCOP, 1973, p. 13)
- A view that the police role should be to *maintain ordered liberty* emphasizing that acting both coercively and non-coercively and acting to protect personal liberty and civil rights are all implied by that role (American Bar Association, 1973, p. 10; Kenney, 1972, p. 20)
- A behavioralist view that the police are a *mechanism for the legitimate distribution of situationally justified force in society* emphasizing that a potential for legitimate police resort to force is found in all situations where police become involved (Bittner, 1970, pp. 38–41).

All of these views except the crime-fighting view imply a concern that the importance of quality police patrol receive more emphasis. How prevalent each of these views may be within a police department will have much to do with the status of police patrolmen.

Aside from the inappropriateness of the crime-fighting view, given the limited capabilities of police actually to control crime (American Bar Association, 1973, pp. 56–58), this view has the effect of demeaning the significance of patrol work since so little patrol activity is interpretable as directly related to crime fighting. Yet this is the view now dominant in police departments - now staffed largely at all levels by persons with patrol experience. Many of these officers recall the boredom of their own experiences in patrol. They regard the work as dull and take patrolmen for granted (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 189).

A sensitivity to the problems created by these prevailing attitudes is now more common among police administrators. A major recommendation of the 1973 National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals was to enlarge the patrolman's job, and to give more credit for the actual nature of the work performed. The perception of patrol supporting this recommendation has been that the patrol task is defined not by the institutional relationships governing the patrolman as a member of the police bureaucracy, but by his relationships with the citizens seeking his assistance. These professional aspects of patrol work, administrators have felt, should be given more emphasis. Incentives should be developed promoting their mastery within the patrol force.

The changes required are organizational and legal. The organizational issue entailed by any effort to enlarge the role of the patrolman has concerned whether the various aspects of the police tasks which patrolmen encounter should be developed as special assignments and assigned to specialists or whether patrolmen should be encouraged to develop the special skills which would be required. Professionalizing the role of the patrol officer requires that distinctions in the duties and responsibilities of patrol officers be made, providing a basis for career progression in patrol (NACCJSG, 1973, pp. 195–6). Developing such a career progression within the patrol force has been the challenge.

Team organization of police patrols can contribute to this end. Within teams assigned generalist responsibilities, it may be possible to create opportunities for career progression which platoon patrol organizations have lacked.

The legal issues of police professionalization have concerned police discretion. Professionalizing the role of the patrol officer requires explicit legal acknowledgement and authorization of the exercise of police discretion in patrol and the development of procedures for control of

police discretion compatible with public accountability and the promotion of a democratic legal order (American Bar Association, 1973, p. 87; Skolnick, 1966, pp. 238–9).

The efforts of police departments to develop regulations more precisely regulating police relations with the public within present legal constraints have not been adequate. Such efforts commonly have not acknowledged the illegal or not legally authorized techniques upon which departments regularly rely to perform their tasks. The regulations have to that extent been irrelevant and ineffective. Moreover, since these techniques have not been acknowledged, they have not been assessed (American Bar Association, 1973, pp. 90–93).

Any legal changes in the police role will depend upon public and court confidence in police ability to use greater powers responsibly. These issues extend far beyond team policing. What is significant to note here is that the effort characteristic of team policing to establish closer community ties is relevant to this police concern. Team organization of police patrols can contribute to the growth in community trust and police confidence upon which police professionalization and improved police services both ultimately depend.

APPENDIX C. ENGLISH UNIT BEAT POLICING

The development of team policing as an idea and then as a program in the United States has been an evolutionary process that has drawn upon the English experience with Unit Beat Policing and the decentralized patrol operations of police agencies in American small towns and cities.

American law enforcement analysts who have examined the roots of team policing, refer to the 1948 Aberdeen, Scotland experience (O'Brien, 1974, p. 1; Sherman, Milton & Kelly, 1973, p. xiv), as the precurser of England's Unit Beat Policing and America's Team Policing program. However, Americans need not look abroad for the origin of the concepts underlying team policing. For example, towns and counties in the United States with small law enforcement agencies have been relying on the generalist/specialist officer and permanent geographic assignment program for years. Now these elements are being labelled as "new" in team policing. Many other law enforcement approaches used by American small towns are comparable to Team Policing as well as the Unit Beat Policing found in England today (Police Task Force, 1973, p. 63; Kenny, 1972, p. 75).

Unit Beat Policing in England bears only a passing resemblance to the Aberdeen experiment which was abandoned in 1963. At least two facts, both technological, distinguish Unit Beat Policing from the Aberdeen experience - the widespread use of the automobile as a patrol vehicle and the use of the two-way radio. These technologies substantially altered police practices and played a major, predominant role in shaping Unit Beat Policing.

Unit Beat Policing (UBP) was first introduced in Lancashire, England in the summer of 1966 and quickly spread to other areas due to encouragement from the English Police Advisory Board and the Home Office. The English look upon UBP as a means by which to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement operations, with the goals of:

- Improving police-community understanding
- Increasing clearance rates by encouraging information and intelligence flows within the department
- Creating a more challenging and attractive beat role for the beat officer
- Utilizing manpower more efficiently by combining resources
- Minimizing response time (Gregory & Turner, 1968, p. 42)

A. Panda Cars, Radios and Mobility

In designing a plan to reorganize police operations, the English were torn between the need to decrease response time to emergency calls and the desire to maintain an acceptable level of police-community relations. The English had studied the American system of patrol and several Dutch experiments that depended heavily upon motorized units as the primary patrol method. Their studies indicated that, although extensive use of patrol cars reduced response time, it had deletorious effects upon police community relations. The English sought to design a patrol system that would combine acceptable and low response time with a high level of police-community communication and cooperation (Rand, 1970, p. 53).

Prior to Unit Beat Policing, most English constables walked a beat. Motorized patrols were used only on a limited basis. In Lutton, a county of 150,000 people with a police force of 189 officers, sixteen of the twenty patrol beats or divisions were patrolled on foot. The remaining four beats were patrolled by constables on lightweight motorcycles. When the department was reorganized into a Unit Beat Policing system, ten Panda or patrol car beats were created to insure that the entire county would be in quick reach of a motorized patrol unit. At the time that patrol cars were added as a regular feature, the department also supplied panda car operations and foot constables with personal two-way radios connecting all constables with a central dispatcher and with each other (Police College Library reference 3FBp).

The use of Panda cars as a regular patrol feature has increased police mobility. The patrolman in the Panda car is able to answer more calls and to respond at a much faster pace. Although decreased response time is desirable, some English police analysts have questioned whether or not the police are now providing a "fire brigade service." Unlike the American police official, his English counterpart is more distressed that the Panda

driver, separated from the public by his car and the need to answer emergency calls, finds himself alienated from the community (Police College Library reference B(S)P 12).

To fully utilize the potential of the Panda car, English police officials have encouraged Panda constables to leave their cars at regular intervals to check property and observe more carefully conditions on their beats. Emphasizing the point that motor patrol is extremely boring, one police analyst insists that unless the officer leaves his vehicle frequently, "the value of motorized patrol is halved" (Rand, 1970, pp. 56; 58).

B. Area Man and Community Contact

To guard against the loss of community contact that develops with the introduction of regular Panda car patrols, the English divide each Panda beat into two areas and assign a foot constable to each area. Whereas the Panda car provides twenty-four hour coverage and responds primarily to emergency calls, the area officer is responsible for gathering intelligence, maintaining community relations and providing other general type police work. In addition, the English encourage each area man to reside in the community that he polices (Waldron, 1970, p. 15).

The area man is given considerable discretion. He is permitted to work flexible hours and to wear either a uniform or plainclothes as the situation merits. By living in the community he patrols, the constable is aware of its problems and "is required to deal with the whole range of police duties" (Waldron, 1970, p. 15). He generally performs minor investigations by himself and works with an investigator assigned to the unit beat on more complicated cases. Major investigations, like homicide and those that span a wide geographic area, are still handled by the central investigative division of the police department (Police College Library reference 3FBp).

The English recognize that not all constables are suited to the generalist type police work of the area man or capable of working in a self-directed environment with minimal supervision. Mention has been made that means need to be developed to select the right type of constable for the area position. English police analysts note that, in most cases, "men who are given more responsibility gain confidence more quickly." The English place a great deal of responsibility on and confidence in their area men. They support the role of the generalist area man by stating that "although he will need the advice and help of his supervisory officer, he can decide how he should police his [area]" (Gregory & Turner, 1968, p. 44).

C. Investigations and Crime Analysis

The third functional member of the Unit Beat Policing team is usually an investigator. The investigator performs most major investigative work in the beat and assists the two area men with minor investigations. Not all cities have assigned an investigator to each beat. Some have continued all investigations from a central detective unit.

Although investigative work is still highly centralized, English police analysts have recognized a need to encourage greater cooperation between centralized investigative units and the uniformed division. Some departments have attempted to reduce patrol-detective alienation by attaching patrolmen to the investigative division for short periods of time (Police College Library reference B(S)P 12). The more usual approach has been to permit the area man to pursue minor investigations and to assign a detective to each beat who can assist the area man and handle more complicated investigations. Finally, the central investigative division is usually responsible for intra-beat investigations and those requiring highly specialized skills (Gregory & Turner, 1968, p. 46; Police College Library reference 3FBp).

A special position created with the implementation of Unit Beat Policing has been that of the collator. The collator's primary function is to collect, analyze and disseminate crime information. He is stationed at central headquarters and is responsible for encouraging information and intelligence flows within the department. Recognizing a breach between constables and detectives, the collator fosters the exchange of information between the uniform and plainclothes branches. In many cities the collator holds a daily meeting to disseminate his analysis of the crime information which he has received from other members of the department. The English believe the exchange of information encouraged by the collator and the dissemination of this information has improved patrol-detective relations and has increased the chances that more criminals will be detected and apprehended (Police College Library reference 3FBp; Police College Library reference B(S)P 12).

1. *Unit Beat Policing - An Overview*. The following table outlines the positions, manpower and functions of a typical Unit Beat Policing team. The information in the table was compiled from several sources. The Unit Beat team is assigned to a geographic area and is responsible for that beat on a twenty-four hour basis. Each team is geographically decentralized, and the men within it are assigned specialized tasks. The foot constable or area man, however, retains considerable discretion to perform varied functions.

Typical Unit Beat Policing Team

POSITION	MANPOWER	FUNCTION
Beat Sergeant	1 Sergeant	Supervision/Coordination
Beat Panda Car	3 Constables	Preventive patrol/Emergency calls
Area Man	2 Constables	Generalist/Community relations
Beat Investigator	1 Investigator	Investigations/Area specialist

The leader of each unit beat is the sergeant. The introduction of the radio has allowed the sergeant to function as a leader and tactician rather than as an inspector. The sergeant can now plan the activities of the team and, with the radio, easily coordinate these activities (Gregory & Turner, 1968, p. 46). Three men are assigned to the Panda car and work in shifts to provide twenty-four hour coverage to the entire beat. We have indicated that a typical team has a beat investigator. This is not always the case. In Manchester, for example, investigative work has not been decentralized to the beat level.

This section on Unit Beat Policing is not comprehensive, nor is it based upon a thorough literature review. It does provide, however, a limited review of police thinking in England pertaining to team policing. The emphasis on the foot patrolman in English police thinking is in extreme contrast to the American emphasis upon highly mobile motorized patrol units. The fundamental operating assumption among English police administrators is that crimes are prevented, detected and cleared at a greater rate when a constable knows his community and its people and when people of the community know the constable. Both American and English team policing have emphasized patrol methods combining foot and mobile patrol.

In both England and the United States there is concern with the working relationship between patrol officers and detectives. The English have recognized the problem of specialization within their police departments and have adopted several strategies to make police more effective. The investigations assigned to constables are intended to improve clearance rates and to enlarge the constable's job role. Assigning detectives to unit beat is an attempt to improve clearance rates by making the detective intimately familiar with a small geographic area. The collator's office is designed to coordinate the activities of the patrol and detective divisions.

Finally, the English have been concerned with the police-community isolation that develops when patrolmen are assigned to cars and expected to react to calls that come over the radio. Recognizing the need to have both a mobile force and a strong police-community bond, the English have given each unit beat motorized and foot patrolmen.

Although urban police departments can look to small-town America for a model of team policing, the English example holds out the fact that many of the elements of neighborhood team policing have been practiced successfully by the English in highly urbanized areas. Unit Beat Policing, as practiced in England, presents an alternative strategy to the centralization and specialization that developed as the typical mode of police operations in America during the 1950's.

APPENDIX D. TEAM POLICING DEFINITIONS

The following are examples of team policing definitions drawn from the literature:

Basic Elements of Neighborhood Team Policing

1. Team has 20–40 officers.
2. Professional supervision, with consultation, setting of objectives, an in-service training program, encouraging suggestions, permitting the exercise of responsibility with necessary limits.
3. Team command responsible for all aspects of police service on an around-the-clock basis.
4. Team provides all police service for its neighborhood. Team members are sent out of the neighborhood only in emergencies. Non-team members take calls in the neighborhood only in emergencies.
5. Officers given extended assignments to a neighborhood.
6. Special police units inform themselves of team goals and, whenever possible, consult in advance with the local team commander.
7. Community relations as an essential patrol function, planned by the team commander and the team and consisting of good police service, friendly on-street contacts and attendance at meetings of various community groups.
8. Decentralized planning (crime analysis, use of plainclothes or special tactics, investigations, preventive programs, referral programs, service activities).
9. Decentralized Planning (innovation by team commanders subject to review by their superiors).

(Bloch & Specht, 1972, p. 2)

Summary of Team Policing Elements

Operational Elements

Stable geographic assignment
Intra-team interaction
Formal team conferences
Police-community communication
Formal community conferences
Community participation in police work
Systematic referrals to social agencies

Organizational Supports

Unity of supervision
Lower-level flexibility
Unified delivery of services
Combined patrol and investigative functions
(Sherman, Milton & Kelly, 1973, p. 7)

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals

> Total team policing can be defined as: (1) combining all line operations of patrol, traffic, and investigation into a single group under common supervision; (2) forming teams with a mixture of generalists and specialists; (3) permanently assigning the teams to geographic areas, and; (4) charging the teams with responsibility for all police services within their respective areas. (NACCJSG, 1973, p. 156)

Detroit Beat Commander System

> Two basic operational requirements characterize the Beat Commander system. First, a team of patrolmen is assigned to a limited geographical area - the beat or neighborhood . . . Second, the sergeants in charge are responsible for this patrol team and accountable for all police service within this geographical area. (Bloch & Specht, 1972, p. 55)

Cincinnati Comsec Program

> Like many of the team policing programs before it, Cincinnati's program included permanent assignment of officers to small geographically and demographically defined neighborhoods. Informal interaction and increased communications between team members was stressed with special emphasis on unity of supervision, decentralization of decision-

making to the team level, unified delivery of all police services (except investigation of homicides) and the development of the "generalist" role for officers through encouraging officers to perform both investigative and patrol functions. (Clarren & Schwartz, 1974, p. 3)

APPENDIX E. TEAM POLICING GOALS

The following are exemplary statements of goals and objectives reported in the team policing literature:

Dayton Team Policing Objectives

> The three original objectives in the Program were 1) to test the generalist/specialist approach to policing; 2) to produce community-centered police structure through decentralization and an attempt to understand the neighborhood life styles; and 3) to alter the traditional militaristic posture of the police toward a more professional model. (OLEPA, 1972, p. 2)

New Brunswick Project Objectives

> General Order #7 recited the following purposes of the New Brunswick experiment:
>
> 1. To fix responsibility for a small area.
> 2. To furnish a visible police presence.
> 3. To combine foot and motorized patrol.
> 4. To combine patrol and investigative duties.
> 5. To overcome police boredom.
> 6. To bring the police closer to the community.
>
> (O'Brien, 1974, p. 2)

Detroit Beat Commander System Objectives

> An experiment designed to improve police-community relations and crime control was tested out in Detroit's Tenth Precinct . . . Decentralized authority and team identification with a small neighborhood are intended to improve police-community relations and to achieve better crime control. Citizen cooperation with police is viewed as essential both in the prevention of offenses and in the apprehension of criminals. (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 55)

Cincinnati Comsec Impact Goals

Information Utilization

Goal 1.1 Develop team policing principles and procedures which can be transplanted to other districts in Cincinnati and other departments in the country.
Goal 1.2 Improve overall management of the Cincinnati Police Division on the basis of experiences and techniques developed through COMSEC.

Police/Community Relations

Goal 2.1 Develop in the citizens a sense of trust and close identity with the police. *Goal 2.2* Improve citizen cooperation with police in crime prevention, detection and apprehension activities. *Goal 2.3* Develop a proprietary interest in the police for the safety and welfare of the people they serve. *Goal 2.4* Improve police understanding and sensitivity to the people they serve.

Victimization

Goal 3.1 Reduce the current level of criminal victimization of people and property.

Support Services

Goal 4.1 Provide the necessary manpower, equipment, training and support services to COMSEC. *Goal 4.2* Develop program management, reporting monitoring and evaluation systems and procedures. *Goal 4.3* Encourage and support organization mechanism for greater citizen involvement in the public safety needs of their neighborhoods. *Goal 4.4* Maintain departmental, citizen, city administration and media support for the program. *Goal 4.5* Develop COMSEC-related policies and procedures for the direction, supervision and control of COMSEC patrol teams. (Cincinnati Police Division, April 1972)

APPENDIX F. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Allen, Capt. William, Chief of Investigations
Arlington County, Virginia Police Department
Betjemann, William, Crime Control Coordinator
Albany, New York Police Department
Brand, Dennis, Aide to Sheriff
Multnomah County, Oregon Sheriff's Office
Clarren, Sumner, Project Associate
Cincinnati Project, Urban Institute
Hill, Fred, Administrative Aide to Chief
Tucson Police Department
Legard, Robert, Sheriff
Loudoun County, Virginia
Lewis, Joe, Director of Evaluations
Police Foundation
Pence, Gary, Director
Lucas County, Ohio Criminal Justice Planning Unit
Peterson, Paulette, Coordinator of Planning and Research
St. Paul, Minnesota Police Department
Schwartz, Al, Project Director
Cincinnati Project, Urban Institute
Seiffert, Lt. Joseph, Patrol Section Commander
Alexandria, Virginia Police Department
Thurmond, Capt. G. H., 5th District Commander
Dayton, Ohio Police Department
Wilkins, Dean, Program Evaluator
Cincinnati Police Department

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